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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the necessity and the feasibility of
the establishment of a corps of Naval strategists. The research
centered on determining the applicability of advantages of the
German General Staff concept to the Navy Planning Systems,
without suffering the disadvantages of the concept. Also
analyzed in this report is the feasibility of instituting
procedures currently found on the British, French and Israeli
defense planning establishments as well as from American
corporate business strategic planning. A proposal is offered
that would establish a network of specifically educated and
trained naval strategists that would be responsible for long-
range planning in the U.S. Navy. The plan includes a proposed
training, education, career pattern and assignment flow for
the network of planners. The aim of the strategic planning
network is to improve the effectiveness of Navy long-range
planning through enhanced efficiency, consistency and continuity,
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Navy has not formulated a consistent
long-range strategic plan. A variety o£ reasons support
this contention, ranging from American cultural characteristics
to idiosyncracies inherent in the Naval service itself.
Examination of the evidence may indicate that long range
strategic planning in the present-day Navy is essentially
impossible.
"Since WWII, the need for long range planning has in-
creased. Unfortunately, the priority given to long
range planning within the Navy has steadily declined,
even as the need for a regular system for accomplishing
such planning has steadily grown."-
Samuel P. Huntington expressed several common criticisms
that have plagued planners since the end of World War II. He
states that 1) national security policy lacks unity and
coherence. Decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, unguided
by an over-all purpose. 2) national security policies are
stated largely in terms of compromises and generalities. The
real issues are not brought to the highest level for decision.
3) Delay and slowness characterize the policy-making process.
Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political
Process", ed. Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings
in the Making of American Foreign Policy
,
(New York: The
MacMillan Company, 1965J p. 400. Richard Smoke further suggests
that America gave very little notice to national security
policy for 125 years prior to World War II. "Until well into
the twentieth century, the national security of the United
States was granted, nearly free of charge, by nature - that is,
by its unique geographical position on the North American
continent. It is a fact that at no time in recorded history
has any major nation been able to prosper and develop for so
long, devoting relatively so little attention and resources to
its national security ... The United States therefore was able
to progress for about 125 years, to almost 1940, with only

Studies commissioned by the Navy relate with certainty,
that no single organizational change to the system would
3
result in necessary solutions to problems. Therefore, small
incremental changes are more in order.
This thesis examines the necessity and feasibility for
establishing of a corps of naval strategists. Can the Navy
continue to be successful in the future using a part-time
approach to strategic planning? Other questions that will be
addressed include, is the strategic planning system used by
the Navy during wartime suited to peacetime, war-preparation
or Cold War periods? Are there ways to adapt some of the
advantages of the French and German General Staffs and
American General Board to the present-day Navy without
extremely marginal attention paid to what would now be termed
national security. Richard Smoke, "The Evolution of American
Defense Policy," ed. John F. Reichard and Steven R. Sturm,
American Defense Policy
,
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1982) p. 97. Without consistent national
military objectives, the U.S. Navy as an arm of the government
has justifiably not generated long term strategic plans
because of ill-defined or changing national objectives. In a
speech given at the Naval War College in August 1947, Admiral
Robert B. Carney (Later to become the Chief of Naval Operations)
stated that the Navy was "wholly unprepared materially and
spiritually" for the entry of the United States into World
War II. On two previous occasions in the fifty years before
1941 the nation and the Navy had gone to war, each time
similarly unprepared, each time later victorious, but each
time grievously misreading the military lessons and the
political consequences of the conflict. Spain had been the
foreseen enemy before 1898, Germany before 1941, and Japan
before 1941, but the dominant Navy planners had correctly
anticipated and planned for very little else about each of
these wars. Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the
U.S. Navy, 1945-1946
,
(Chapel Hill NC: The University of

suffering the unsavory consequences of the former and the
inefficiencies of the latter? Would the addition of a Naval
strategist network to the present Navy planning system
improve the Na"vy's ability to deal with its own vast organ-
ization, sister services, the Department of Defense and other
governmental agencies? What career path and career sacrifices
will be required of Naval strategic planners?
A. STRATEGIC PLANNING DEFINED
Strategy and its supporting element strategic planning
have been variously defined from the grandest level to its
perimeter in tactical issues. The definitions for strategic
planning have evolved along with the growing concerns with
and the direction of strategic thought. Edward Meade Earle
relates that,
"Strategy deals with war, preparation for war, and the
waging of war. Narrowly defined, it is the art of
military command, of projecting and directing a
campaign. .. Only the most restrictive terminology would
now define strategy as the art of military command.
North Carolina Press, 1966) p. 3. "Since the disestablishment
of the Long Range Objectives Group in September 1970, the Navy
has not had a regularly constituted long range planning group
capable of performing both conceptual and functional planning,
nor a group with direct access to the services' highest
policy makers." "The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment,"
Maritime Balance Study
,
(Washington DC: Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations, 15 April 1979) p. A-17.
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In the present-day world, then, strategy is the part
o£ controlling and utilizing the resources o£ a nation -
or a coalition of nations - including its armed forces,
to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively
promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential,
or merely presumed. The highest type of strategy -
sometimes called grand strategy - is that which so
integrates the policies and armaments of the nation that
the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is
undertaken with the maximum chance of victory."^
This delineation surfaced during World War II and has most
often been modified to accommodate a specific interest.
Another modification attempts to force a more concise
definition, but usually resulting in a more generalized
version of the original. As difficult as it is to define so
broad a concept, it lies outside that indefinable category
which includes national interest, public will etc., and some
degree of precision can be realized. John M. Collins offers a
more modern refinement and a differentiation of the elements
of strategy.
"Military strategy is predicated on physical violence or
the threat of violence. Equally important, it looks
beyond victory toward a lasting peace. Military strategy
is mainly the purview of statesmen. Grand strategy
controls military strategy, which is only one of its
elements . "^
Both of the above generalized definitions reduce a universe
of elements to a single statement. The resulting notion that
7[
Edward Meade Earle, Makers of Modern Strategy
,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944) pT viii.
John M. Collins, Grand Strategy
,
(Annapolis, Maryland
Naval Institute Press, 1973} p. 15.
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is conveyed roughly translates into whatever it takes to
accomplish whatever it is you think you should do. If your
lot is improved according to your established desires by
following the chosen course of action then your strategy is
proven successful. Less diligence is exerted in attempting
to ascertain why the plan produced success than is exerted
in trying to answer why it failed to achieve the desired ends.
It is assured that the successful plan contained the universal
set of elements required for success, whereas conversely, the
failed strategy is examined totally - the set of strategic
elements within the plan and those outside the plan. Chance
irrational interventions and a host of other foreseeable and
unforeseeable factors can have interrupted an otherwise
properly planned successful procession of events. Risk,
uncertainty and chance can be addressed and estimated, but
never with certainty, never universally identified nor
managed. Therefore, it can be appreciated that difficulty is
encountered when reducing strategy to a set of inclusive
elements. This difficulty is far overshadowed by trying to
operationalize generalizations on a daily but deadly basis.
Strategies are born out of a long process of deliberations
and analysis. They often compromise between imponderables,
imperatives and perceptions. A strategy is not a beginning,
not a seedbed. Strategies address perceived needs or desires.
Objectives (ends), once established serve to focus efforts




1. Interests and objectives establish strategic
requirements
.
2. Policies provide the rules for satisfying
them
3. Available assets provide the means.
The national objectives are generated by a consensus of the
public interests and governmental objectives or perceived
imperatives. From this universal collection of aims is
derived the national military objectives.
"National objectives are specific goals which a
nation seeks in order to advance, support or protect
identified national interests. National objectives
can be broadly categorized as political, economic
or security."'
To meet the responsibilities established in the latter
concern - security - the military services are maintained
and charged with guarding the security of the United States
"The national military strategy is that component
of the national strategy prescribing the manner in
which the elements of the national military power
will be developed and employed. To be effective
it must be integral to the national strategy, able
to achieve the national objectives in face of the
projected threat, and capable of accommodating to
change. The U.S. national military strategy includes
three principal elements.
1. Deterrence of aggression requires a clear
and evident capability and resolve to fight
any level of conflict, so that any potential
r-
John M. Collins, Grand Strategy
,
(Annapolis, Maryland:
Naval Institute Press, 1973) p"^ T.
7
"Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy," Naval Warfare
Publication 1 (Rev. A), (Washington D.C.: Department or the
Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations) p. 1-2-1.
12

opponent will assess his own risks to be
unacceptable. Toward this end the United
States maintains forces capable of
exerting military power across the entire
spectrum of requirements from show-the-
flag deployments overseas to retaliation
for strategic nuclear attack.
2. Flexible Response. Should deterrence fail,
a full range of options for applying
military power should be available to
control the escalation, scope, intensity
and duration of any conflict. Military
forces available to provide for flexible
response include strategic nuclear forces,
theater nuclear forces and general purpose
forces.
3. Forward Strategy . The national military
strategy of the United States is a forward
strategy, driven by geopolitical consider-
ations. The U.S. is characterized by its
insular position on the North American
continent. It has only two international
borders, neither of which is threatened
by a hostile force, and communicates with
the rest of the world to the east, west
and south by way of two major oceans.
Additionally, the interdependent free-
world economy increasingly depends upon
the use of ocean shipping and access to
the resources of the seas and sea bottoms.
This forward strategy of the United States
utilizes the oceans as barriers for the
defense of the country, as military lines
of communications with overseas allies,
and as avenues of world trade. "^
This broad tasking is further delineated in the mission
of the U.S. Navy, as set forth in Title 10, U.S. Code. The
U.S. Navy... "is to be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained










in effect, to assume continued maritime superiority for the
United States. This means that the U.S. Navy must be able
to defeat, in the aggregate, potential threats to continued
free use of the high seas by the United States. In its
simplest terms, defeating the maritime threat means destruction
of hostile aircraft, surface ships, and submarines which
threaten the seaborne forces of the United States and its
9
allies." Respective services are tasked with specific
primary and collateral functions by the Department of Defense
Directive 5100.1.
Meeting the responsibilities levied upon the U.S. Navy of
today is an awesome task. Fulfilling the aforementioned
charge of being "able to achieve the national objectives in
face of the projected threat" is dwarfed in comparison to the
charge that follows it "of being capable of accommodating to
change." Far-sightedness is crucial to accommodating to
change. Future enemy intentions and capabilities must be
accurately assessed then applied to a planning continum. This
on-going strategic plan should be able to receive and
assimilate change. It will remain the driving force not the
force driven by change. If wisely conceived and set to motion
the strategy could be fine-tuned by a variation in inputs and
adjustments made to meet objectives. There would exist no









In order to meet its responsibilities and prepare for the
future the U.S. Navy must incorporate a wide range of factors.
"Long range planning in the Navy is made up of a number
of different elements, including technological fore-
casts and schedules for research and development; cost
analyses and estimates of future budgets; strategic
estimates of future politico-military situations; and
statements of future operational requirements for
individual weapons systems. "-^^
Long range planning must define future roles and missions
for naval units and propose the means for accomplishing
future tasks. Guidance and coordination for this future
effort must account for a period five to twenty years in the
future. Naval planning is divided into three main time
categories. Short term planning ranges up to three years,
mid range planning from three to ten years. Long range
planning is generally viewed as eleven to twenty years. Time
divisions serve to focus efforts but suffer from overlaps in
efforts and from ripple-effects of unforeseen events. Planners
responsible for developing guidance that takes place under
any timeframe heading must be cognizant of planning efforts
in the other divisions and must compensate in their own
planning by applying various approximation factors of proximate
results of other plans.
For purposes of this study, naval strategic planning will
include all elements of the navy planning process which are
"The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment," Maritime
Balance Study
,
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, 15 April 1979) p. A-1.
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used to insure the meeting of the Navy's responsibilities
under the national military objectives. These elements,
include threat assessments, resource allocations, force
composition and levels; operational employment and deployment
of conventional and nuclear naval forces. An important long
range aspect of this process will require accurate forecasting
of geopolitical and military situations which in turn demand
estimates of future forces necessary to meet responsibilities.
B. CONSTRAINTS ON LONG RANGE PLANNING
Each society has its own set of procedures and its own
mechanism in place to plan for its security and future needs.
-Procedures may be very similar but the individual processes
will vary according to culture, the form of government,
economic and military standing as well as its perception of
its own security posture. Established procedures in
representative forms of government resemble a set of formulas
for avoiding or surmounting obstacles to action rather than
a pure administrative mechanism for planning. The idiosyncrases
of each governments determines the nature and force of
impediments to action. As a pluralistic democracy, the
United States has its own set of unique hinderances to long
range planning. The list of encumberances to the U.S.
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., and Richard C. Synder, American
Foreign Policy
,




commitment to a consistent long range plan include cultural,
political, economic and military factors. America's Naval
service additionally, embraces inherent drawbacks to long
term strategy.
A cultural trait of the United States that must be
12
considered in military matters is its impatience. Sir
Robert Thompson, an impartial but close observer of America's
involvement in Vietnam, sighted American impatience as a major
contributing factor in our downfall. Americans detest
protracted military operations of any kind but especially
those which interfere with their lives for ill-defined or
unjustified reasons. During the Korean Conflict after
negotiations were begun, the American citizenry turned against
the efforts to secure a lasting settlement. Growing unrest
with the continued fighting for two years after the onset of
talks, culminated with American impatience demanding the
cessation of hostilities at almost any cost.
-I o
^ A. Russel Buchanan, "American Attitudes Toward War," ed.
Alexander DeConde, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy
,
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1 y / 8 J p . T6~. A concise,
definitive protrayal of American cultural characteristics
including impatience is presented in Gabriel Almonds',
"Public Opinion, Opinion-Makers, and Foreign Policy," Ibid.,
Furniss and Snyder, p. 56-59. Cultural impatience is also
a focus in Stanley Hoffman's, "Restraints and Choices in
American Foreign Policy," Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 39.
Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam
,
(New York: David
McCay Co., Inc., 1969) p. 125.
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Formulating long term strategic plans that will
produce continuous, noticeable results in the near term, are
essentially out o£ the realm of the possible, given the
reality of American impatience. The capricious winds that
blow in the United States are driven by rapid, hardhitting
media and communication networks that are unparalleled in
any other society. This information blitz is aimed at a
population descendant from a society born out of revolution.
With only glimpses presented of complex situations that
appear to change rapidly on the surface, Americans find it
difficult to stay a course designed to meet objectives in the
distant future amidst what appears to be a shifting threat
environment. A.T. Mahan voiced concerns about America's
long range views to policy. While discussing whether there
would be a revival of a war fleet to protect the proposed
Panama Canal he stated, "This is doubtful, however, because
a peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and far-
sightedness is needed for adequate military preparation,
especially in these days." American restiveness does not
preclude long range plans, but it indicates a high
improbability of a plan's long term acceptability.
Politically, the American style of democracy poses
certain impediments to the wide acceptance and adherence to
14 .. -I
Walter Millis, American Military Thought
,
(New York:
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1966} p. 210.
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an extensive and extended strategic program. The recurring
electoral process of the United States is designed to insure
that government is infused with updated desires and demands
of the public at large. The system is flawed in that the
population rarely speaks with a unified voice, is never
motivated by eventual outcomes but is driven by short-term
needs, i.e., taxes, employment, inflation, etc. Political
leaders are obliged to decide on a course of action then sell
that decision to the public. We are faced with a leader, who
is the product of a multi-faceted, complex machine froth with
conflict and who chooses one option over another with much
controversy remaining. The leader at the apex of this vast
pyramid is judged at intervals on the basis of existing
indicators not on the basis of overall or long term
consequences of the action. Each elected official along with
his manpower force has his performance laid to arbitration
before the electorate every two years for members of Congress,
four years for the executive branch and six years for the
Senate. Effectiveness must be demonstrated by each official
to coincide with these intervals in order to be judged
competent enough to warrant continuation in the present
capacity. With a continuing influx of new ideas and
^^Ibid.
,
Furniss and Snyder, p. 198-199.
Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 213.
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perspectives each desiring an input to the nation's course,
constant revision of any long term policy is inevitable.
The military establishment is by law to be subserviant
to the political structure. It is the military's responsibility
to inform the political elite of threats and of the military's
capacity to meet objectives and defend the nation if called
upon. In many cases the newly arrived civilian official is
forced to rely upon the military for information or seek
outside, often unsanctioned advice. For the president this
outside advice is offered from personal advisors -both formal
and informal - for the legislator, advice is drawn from or
compiled by his own staff. Sound military proposals exposed
to so fragmented and interest-diverse a network is faced
with early rejection or a drastic watering-down by the
consensus-building matrix. A plan to provide long term
solutions to projected problems must be more than militarily
sound; it must be politically feasible. The barometer for
political feasibility varies regularly at two, four and six-
year intervals and more often during other periods of time.
Acceptance of a long range course for the nation is not
possible without deference to changes; a viable long range
plan cannot be the product of continuous modification.
Economic obstacles are particularly deleterious to long
term strategic initiatives. Even though the military




national budget, the military exercises no direct control
over the allocation of those vast resources. Much effort
has gone into streamlining the budgetary process so as to
provide planners with fairly accurate estimates of outyear
spending levels. Neither reasonably precise five year pro-
jections on expenditures nor long range strategic plans can
be any more than course guidelines for the future when all
spending is subjected to the annual budget review cycle.
Out-year projections which are provided as guidelines to
planners can drastically altered or rendered useless by the
congressional budget process. So many internal and external
factors affect the national budget such as inflation,
T7 The 1984 Defense Posture Statement related that total
Obligational Authority of $274.1 billion, a 10% real increase
over FY 1983 represents defense spending as equal to 28% of
the total federal budget, and 6.8% of GNP. Annual Report
to the Congress
,
Report of the Secretary of Defense , Caspar
W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985
Authorization Request and FY 1984-88 Defense Programs,
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1983)
p. 3. For the 1983 fiscal year which began October 1, 1982,
the Pentagon expected to spend (outlays) $221 billion. As
a proportion of the federal budget - 29 cents out of every
dollar - or 6% of GNP will be spent for defense in 1983.
But of the funds which Congress can debate and apportion each
year (three-quarters of the total federal budget is previously
obligated for Social Security, interest on the national debt,
etc.) 78 percent is earmarked for meeting defense needs.
Some expense allocations are of course contested, for example
about $24 billion in the 1983 budget proposal was designated
for the Veterans Administration which is considered residual
cost of previous wars is not a part of the defense budget
nor is the allocation for NASA - the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration. Sheila Tobias, Peter Goudinoff,
Stefan Leader, and Shelah Leader, What Kinds of Guns Are They
Buying for Your Butter? (New York! William Morrow and
Company, inc., 1982) p. 280-282.
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world-wide energy supplies, currency strength, trade and trade
partners, etc., that multi-year financial forecasts are
essentially not possible even with major modifications to the
existing apparatus.
Militarily, long range planning is possible, but the
present structure of the national military establishment
insures that any plan will be slow in coming and a shared
adulteration of the optimum. Autonomy of the service branches
has been a criticism of the military force for decades. Since
the formation of the Joint Army-Navy Board seeds for conflict
between the services have been present. As separate military
branches, the Army and Navy reported to the president as
Commander in Chief at the cabinet level and both were funded
independently of the other service. World War II and the
operational theater overlaps made evident the demand for a
more unified method of employing armed forces. When plans
were being drawn up for the post-war forces, neither the Army,
Navy not the soon-to-be-established Air Force, colloborated
on proposals nor correlated efforts at all. With the establish-
ment of the central Department of Defense and single military
budget, the services became competitors for the same pot of
money. The ability of the individual services to have their
propositions accepted and their appropriations requests met
were viewed as tantamount to that services' survival or at least
1 o
independence. In such an environment, long range planning
rsArnold Kantner, Defense Politics
,
(Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press , 19 7 9) p"i 90.
22

is achieveable at the individual service level but highly
improbable when joined and/or concurred with by the other
services.
Idiosycrasies of the Naval service become stumbling
blocks to the generation of long range plans by the single
service and to joint proposals by other services. The Navy
has since the dissolution of the General Board during World
War II, relegated its strategic thought to a series of ad
19hoc boards and study groups. This procession of temporary
efforts were staffed by very capable officers, often the
brightest contemporary military minds available.
However, with the high caliber of the individual came
fleet operational and career requirements. In many cases
the officers did not remain with a study group for more than
two years, rarely for the duration of a board. Each Chief
of Naval Operations has recognized a need for long range
thought and have quickly appointed his own group to study
alternatives and make recommendations to him. This has
usually resulted in the disbanding of the commission appointed
four years before with little pass down of lessons learned
to the incoming group. Fresh looks at old problems can be
beneficial but much continuity and consistency of effort is
lost by the rotation of personnel and ad hoc study group
approach to long range planning.
Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the
U.S. Navy
,
(Washington, U. C. : Naval Research Advisory Committee,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 1980) p. 6-8.
23

Neither last nor least in the list impediments to long-
range strategic planning in the United States is the
complexity of day-to-day problems. Difficulty seems to
expand to fill whatever time span is allotted. It is
virtually impossible to isolate oneself from current crises
to look at the future. Unfortunately, many of tomorrow's
decisions must be based on or cognizant of the outcome of
today ' s crises
.
In summary, there appear to be many hurdles that must be
negotiated prior to any operable strategic planning can be
initiated. This study will propose an alternative to the
Navy's part-time attention paid to long-range planning. By
a small, incremental improvement to the present system, the
Navy will be able to function more efficiently in the day-to-
day realm, perhaps to the degree commensurate with that
required for the development of-long range strategic thinking,
Chapter Two will examine past and present experiences in
long-range strategic planning that have taken place outside
the United States military establishment. It is hoped that
by comparing the results of the German and French General
Staff systems and modern corporate planning accomplishments,
some applications can be made to improve the planning process
of the U.S. Navy. Analyzing the conditions under which these
planning efforts were made and measuring their relative
success in meeting the objectives may assist in the
development and better understanding of our present problems.
24

In Chapter Three, the history of the U.S. Navy planning
system will be traced to reveal what has been attempted in
the past to meet planning objectives an understanding of what
has been tried, under what circumstances and what levels of
success or failure were achieved could aid in the development
of a planning framework that will better prepare the Navy for
the future it will face.
Chapter Four will relate the proposal for a corps of Naval
strategists. Current planning needs of the Navy will be
viewed with an eye toward matching the qualifications and
training of the Naval strategists to those needs. The
authority, power, influence triangle model will be used to
demonstrate that the strategist will have no authority in
decision-making, but will be a source of increased power,
then influence to the admiral or staff commander where
assigned. A career ladder, unique to Naval strategists will
be presented, showing sea-shore rotation cycles, training
requirements and potential assignments.
The Concluding Chapter will summarize the previous
attempts at strategic planning both inside and outside the
Navy then weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the corps
of Naval strategists proposal. Hopefully some appraisal can
be made of the corps concepts' applicability to meeting the
long-term needs of the U.S. Navy.
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II. COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTS IN
LONG-RANGE PLANNING
In examining whether a corps of naval strategists could
improve or be useful to the Navy's strategic planning efforts,
it is important that there be an understanding of the
experiences of the past. Reviewing the attempts of various
organization's experience in developing strategic planning
processes can shed some light on the matter of matching a
planning procedure to a unique set of organizational circum-
stances. To see how a nation or corporation interpreted its
needs and environment, how the system that was devised met
the established objectives and what appeared to be responsible
for its success or failure can be very beneficial to future
efforts. Of particular interest in this study will be the
selection, training process and qualifications for the
planners involved in other experiences and what positive
characteristics can be applied to a Navy planning system.
Equally important will be the knowledge of what is not
applicable to a modern naval planning process.
The study will initially examine the relationship between
the nature of an organization and the planning system devised
to meet specific requirements. Next, a comparative analysis
of the German General Staff, the French, British and Israeli
military planning structures will be presented. Lastly, a
glimpse of recent developments in strategic planning in
26

the corporate business will be examined for potential
applicability.
To say that the nature of an institution or organization
determines the structure of its planning process is an
oversimplification. But, controlling bodies can compel a
system to produce a specific type of planning process or can
limit or constrain the influence of the planning structure.
Various categories of objectives (ends) will also to a degree
determine the characteristics of the planning system to be
established. For most nation-states the ultimate objective
is survival of the society within that nation-state. The
process adopted to plan for survival cannot be one given to
underestimation of imperatives, contentment with sufficiency
nor one blind to competing though subordinate demands.
Survival strategy requires that whatever course of action is
decided upon it cannot be one that requires test cases - trial
and error methods - for measures of its acceptability or
validity. A survival strategy is seldom implemented, it
remains as a deterrent to other's actions. If called upon
though, its stakes are so high that every guarantee of the
success of the plan must be sought. It is for this reason
that forces involved in the planning and implementing of these
strategies tend to overestimate the problems and over-
compensate with the accumulation of means available to carry
out this plan. Should a nation-state find itself surrounded
by weak or content neighbors, its strategies may temporarily
27

shift to a plan aimed at expansion or consolidation, but its
survival is rarely ever jeopardized to accommodate ambitions.
Organizations whose purpose is gain-seeking or maxi-
mization of profits can install a more efficient, calculating
20planning system. Trial runs can be a method of adjustment
and modification to a strategy. Failure, even though
debilitating, can be overcome, and serve to strengthen the
organization rather than destroy it.
An organization or institution settles on the planning
system to be dependent upon based on its perceptions of
needs, threats, goals, environment and what is acceptable/
compatible with its unique internal structure. A corporation
satisfied with a planning system that consistently produces
low capital investment risk and ten per cent growth will
appear quite different from a corporation willing to discount
risk to maximize profits.
A totalitarian government appears to be a more efficient
system for planning. It usually operates with a well-defined,
centralized decision-making framework one not driven by an
unmanageable number of demand inputs. A monarchy has a single,
all-powerful decision-maker where decisions can be made
instantaneously and implemented almost as quickly. Totalitarian
states such as the Soviet Union rely upon an all powerful
2
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controlling group that must respond to relatively few
internal and external demands. With the apparent efficiency
of a totalitarian system comes increased internal security
demands. Internal control is generally maintained by force
which requires a diversion of some efforts and resources for
the maintenance of and continued legitimization of the
21
centralized control structure.
Democratic societies greatly complicate the decision-
making process. Being forced to reach a consensus from a
complex interest-diverse population on all major issues,
insures that most decisions will be late and lacking. In
the nineteenth century De Tocqueville suggested that
"a democracy is unable to regulate the details of an
important undertaking. .. that democracies obey the
impulse of passion rather than the suggestions of
prudence. "22
A century later, Walter Lippman felt that de Tocqueville '
s
observations were becoming an increasingly accurate portrayal
of American public's role in national security policy-making.
He was quoted by a scholar as suggesting that,
"the people have imposed a veto upon the judgements
of the informed and responsible officials. They
have compelled the governments, which usually knew
what would have been wiser, was necessary, or was
more expedient, to be too late with too little, or
too long with too much, too pacifist in peace, and
T\
Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., and Richard C. Snyder, American
Foreign Policy
,
(New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc
.
,





Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in .America
,
(New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1945) vol. 1, p. Zi4-Z3S.
29

too bellicose in war, too neutralist or appeasing in
negotiation or too intransigent. Mass opinion has
acquired mounting power in this century. It has
shown itself to be a dangerous master of decisions
when the stakes are life and death. "23
America operates under a complex form of representative
government, but each democracy struggles under the burden of
endless public debate, decision arbitration and course changes
Seemingly the more crucial the decision or urgent the response
the more dysfunctional in making the decision or agreeing on
the response the democracy appears to be. Under this system,
long-term issues suffer even more excruciating uncertainties.
Lippman adds that,
"The record shows that the people of the democracies,
having become sovereign in this century, have made_
it increasingly difficult for their governments to
prepare properly for war or to make peace. "24
A. THE GERMAN GENERAL STAFF
Any discussion in praise of the German General Staff and
its predecessor the Prussian General Staff, must take into
account the unique cultural, military and geo-political
characteristics of the society out of which it was born.
The Prussian General Staff is a product of the environment
that remained after the Thirty Years War. This phase of
European development is identified by a combination of
T7
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absolute monarchy with a standing army. The observation of
historian von Behrenhorst roughly summarizes the national
base out of which rose one of the most efficient militaristic
societies in history:
"the Prussian monarchy was not a country that had an
army, but an army that had a country which it used
as a billeting area. "25
The foundation of the Staff was formed out of the minor
nobility class. This comparatively small number of noble
families saw military service to the crown as its stepping
stone to greater prominence from what was an eroding financial
and noble status base.
The limited consolidation of the principal regions of
Northern Europe under Frederick the Elector and primarily
under Frederick the Great laid the basis for the rise of
Prussian militarism and the raising of the political sights
for the nation-state. Prussia was surrounded by stronger
neighbors. The Russians to the East, the Hapsburg-Austrian
Empire, the French to the South and the great seapower
England. Couple a perceived external threatening environment,
a fear of encirclement or dismemberment, the absolute
authority and efficient decision-making apparatus of a
monarchy ambition generated by a glimpse of world class
stature and influence brought on by Frederick the Great with
23Walter Goerlitz, translated by Brian Battershaw,
History of the German General Staff
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a powerful, elite devoted to serving the King and the
seedbed for military elitism is prepared. The State was
supreme.
"The officer began to look upon himself as the servant
of the monarch in whom the State was held to be
personified. "^6
This sworn loyalty to the King served as the moral foundation
of the army to come and was responsible for the highly
distinctive mental attitude of the Prussian and later German
officer corps.
B. BEGINNING OF THE STAFF CONCEPT
The German General Staff was a product of a long
historical evolution, credited by some as having stemmed
from the organization of Frederick William of Prussia in
1635.^^ In the mid-1700's Frederick the Great inherited a
trained, growing army from his great-grandfather the Great
Elector. Like his predecessor, Frederick the Great acted as
his own Chief of Staff. He did retain, however, a Quarter-
master-General Staff numbering approximately twenty-five
officers, serving primarily a logistic rather than strategic
operations function. His staff was responsible for
engineering functions such as planning and supervising routes
28
of march and choosing of camping sites and fortified positions.
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From this beginning the staff concept was to grow in size
and influence. In summarizing the history of Prussia it is
important to note that the fearsome power of the Prussian-
German nation evolved from the consolidation of regional
29
societies into one unit in response to the environment of
30
strengthening neighbors. Without the unwavering service
of the nobility as officers seeking to regain family prestige
coupled with a strong, innovative single ruler, it is doubtful
that the nation would have reached world military status.
After suffering a major defeat at the hands of Napoleon, the
General Staff expanded its influence and regained its
composure before the century ended by winning a series of
splendid little wars. It ushered in the period of warfare
that was characterized by short, decisive, minimally dis-
ruptive encounters between armies. Prussia's military exploits
resulting from its General Staff proficiency became the model
for nearly all modern armies of the nineteenth century.
The staff concepts' unprecedented rise to prominence
would not have been likely had the reign of strong military
leader/Kings such as Frederick the Great continued. A
15
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procession o£ militarily inept monarchs allowed the expansion
and dominance of the General Staff. The peak in General
Staff influence came during World War I. Complete control
of military affairs had consistently been denied the General
Staff. The combination of weak leadership by the monarch
and the war ministry and under constant pressure from the
General Staff, direct control of military matters was granted
to the General Staff. The war ministry was left with the
responsibility for logistical and administrative support
only. With direct access to the single decision-maker the
General Staff could dictate strategy and tactics as it saw
fit. With the further weakening of the monarch the Chief of
the General Staff essentially became a dictator. The
disasterous heaping of resources, human and otherwise, were
due largely to the General Staff's unwillingness to surrender
Following Germany's defeat in World War I, the General
Staff was disestablished by treaty, but in name only. The
staff system continued to operate much as it did before the
war but temporarily under a different title. Never was the
Great General Staff to again reach the heights of influence
it held during the First World War. Hitler disliked and
distrusted the General Staff and never felt the need to have
a talk with his Chief of Staff.
1 . Formed Out of a Nation
"Empire created in 1871 by Bismarck's diplomacy and
Prussian military power, despite its institutional
similarities to the Western constitutional regimes.
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was and remained an authoritarian state that
recognized neither the theory nor the practice of
popular sovereignty and self-government; and that
meant that Germany entered the Twentieth Century
without the kind of tradition that might have
enabled it to meet the hard problems that were
awaiting it."^l
This is completely different from the beginnings of
democracy in America. Our nation was born out of the
enlightment period. The American and French revolutions
prepared the stage for the rising of nationalism. Safeguards
against military control were built into the American
Constitution. The State was not to be supreme but was to
serve the needs of the public. This is no insurance that a
nation cannot abandon a constitutional base and change
radically, but its foundation if continually successful in
meeting the needs of the nation serves to dampen wild swings
of the national policy pendulum and resists the subsuming of
national interests to a single coercive force.
The American form of government cannot guarantee against
the realization of the fears of a rampant militarism such as
the Great General Staff, but should that system arise in
America it will be a result of fundamental changes in the
American system. The American system of checks and balances
and public control over government makes impossible the rise
of a policy dictating military elite without a conscientious
n
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relinquishing o£ liberty by the people. This can only occur
i£ the ideal of America is fundamentally altered. If a
military dominated society emerges from what is today America
it is then no longer America from which it emerged.
2. Selection, Qualification and Training
Warfare in the Nineteenth Century began to change
under the influence of two revolutionary forces. The emphasis
in warfare shifted from the mathematic science of war to the
concern for the after effects of political upheaval.
Political objectives increasingly dominated military action.
Concentration on the status of governments after war placed
conflicting limits on the conduct of war. The mass age
joined by rapid technological change forced armies into
increasing military specialization. Governments grew in
size and complexity just as the armies did. Rapidly expanding
bureaucracies became the order for both arms of government.
The French Revolution and the new wave of nationalism began
to be felt and measured in other societies. The Prussian
General Staff had emerged from the stratified feudal society
of Prussia but ran headlong into the sharply opposite
influence of nationalism. The professional militarism begun
during the eighteenth century was not to be reconciled with
the revolutionary implications until the time of the Prussian






Even though serving as his own chief of staff and
planner Frederick the Great recognized the need for subordinate
engineering assistance to manage the details of mounting a
campaign. The twenty-five officers comprising the
Quartermaster-Generals Corps provided a vital link between
the master strategist and those commanders responsible for
execution of orders. With increased military stature and
activity the Quartermaster General Corps expanded to meet
increased needs.
"With the addition of the Brigade Majors the Quarter-
master Generals Corps took on the trappings of a
general staff. "•^-
The Brigade Majors were officers who were assigned to assist
generals by compiling data and reports. The officers moved
from place to place to assist where specifically needed. The
king made the training of these officers his own personal
concern. He demanded that the twelve best pupils of the
Academic des Nobles in every year being taken for Brigade
Major posts.
As much for his desire for personal control as for
increased efficiency, Frederick the Great developed the
practice of assigning an Adjutant-General or an aide-de camp
to each field commander to serve as a royal commissar. During
the Seven Years War, seven such adjutants-general were assigned
32 Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 5.
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to the infantry and cavalry. After 1758 only one adjutant-
general position was maintained with Heinrich Wilhelm von
Anhalt becoming the most influential. He reached the level
of Adjutant-General and Quartermaster-General. After playing
a crucial role in the partition of Poland and in the war of
the Bavarian succession of 1778, von Anhalt, for all intents,
became Frederick the Great's Chief of Staff.
Following the death of Frederick the Great in 1786
military control shifted from the monarch to the army
especially to the powerful staff system. By the early 1800 's
the army command was grappling with the Napoleonic wars and
the shock waves of nationalism from the French Revolution.
The prevailing Prussian adherence to State supremacy was
being challenged by a second school of thought. 1807-1813
saw the emergence of the opinion opposing absolute state power
represented by Stein, Hardenburg, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and
Humbolt. They maintained that the strongest government was
the one that could mobilize the energies of its subjects by
33
giving them rights to match their responsibilities. Efforts
toward reform of the army and the staff came more to the fore
with the Prussian defeat at Jena 1806.
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Scharnhorst introduced the idea of examinations as a
prerequisite to promotion and raised the pay of officers so
as to decrease their reliance upon outside income.
After the earlier insistence of aristocracy service
to the king by Frederick the Great, the Prussian officer
corps in 1806 was composed of only 700 non-nobles in a corps
of 7,100. The early military schools to educate nobles for
the officer corps were uniformly poor. Curricula were designed
to either instruct officers in diplomatic service or
engineering/artillery functions. But after reforms were
implemented the Prussian military training system improved
significantly.
"While all the nations of Europe by 1875 had acquired
the basic elements of military professionalism, in
Prussia alone were these elements developed into a
rounded and complete system. Requirements of general
and special education for entry; examinations;
institutions for higher military education; advancement
by merit and achievement; an elaborate and efficient
staff system; a sense of corporate unity and
responsibility; a recognition of the limits of
professional competence; these Prussia possessed to
an extraordinary degree. "^^
4. General Staff Training
"The Germans have always appreciated that there was
virtue in building the military brain before the
military body. In this they have often stood in
sharp contrast with other great powers. "-^^
^
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Any broad discussions of the German General Staff
concept require an understanding that the General Staff, of
World War I was a product of nearly three centuries of change
In order to determine what aspects of the staff concept might
apply to today, the following remarks about officer training
will be presented as broadly as possible but where major
changes occurred over time, an effort will be made to relate
only the most appropriate or most historically recent
information.
As stated in the beginning, the Staff Officer Corps
was comprised largely of members of the nobility. After the
reform process was begun under the guidance of Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau the officer ranks were opened to all men
regardless of origin. The decree opening the officer ranks
also marks the accepted date for the beginning of the Great
General Staff, August 6, 1808. On that date, the Prussian
government issued its decree on the appointment of officers
which set forth the basic standard of professionalism with
uncompromising clarity: The only title to an officer's
commission shall be, in time of peace, education and
professional knowledge; in time of war, distinguished valor
and perception. From the entire nation, therefore, all
individuals who possess these qualities are eligible for the
highest posts. All previously existing class preference
in the military establishment is abolished, and every man.
40

without regard to his origins, has equal duties and equal
37
rights.
At the close of the nineteenth century the prestige
and quality of the General Staff Corps was at its peak.
Acceptance for training for the Staff Corps required the
successful completion of a rigorous training program.
"As a result of rigid competitive examinations, a few
candidates (approximately 150 during the years
immediately preceding World War I) were selected
from the entire officer corps to begin a three-year
course of intensive study at the famous Kreigsakademie.
At the end of this course, roughly thirty per cent
of the candidates passed a competitive examination
covering, in addition to subjects of a military
nature, such matters as personality, character,
general education and personal behavior. These
successful candidates then were "commended to the
Great General Staff," usually for a term of two
years . ^^
The two years of application of education on the
General Staff was in effect an apprenticeship. Candidates
were assigned to various divisions within the Staff Corps
where they could apply their military education to the
solution of specific problems in three distinct phases.
1. Weekly tactical exercises on maps;
2. More ambitious exercises directed by the
department chiefs at the end of the winter;
3. Participation in the several strategic exercises
personally conducted each year by the Chief of
the General Staff himself. -^^
T7 '.Ibid., Huntington, p. 30-31.
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Definite assignment to the General Staff came only
after successfully passing a third competitive examination.
Of the 150 candidates accepted at the academy only four or
five remained to be assigned permanently to the Staff. A
reserve of Staff Officer candiates was maintained from those
rejected at various intervals in the training program.
Failure in the later stage did not preclude eventual
assignment to the Staff.
5. Formal Education
Vast improvements in the educational preparation of
Staff officers were begun in 1810 with the establishment of
the Kriegsakademie by Scharnhorst. Candidacy for admission
to the War Academy and the Staff Officer Training program
followed five years of military service, certification by
one's commanding officer and passage of the previously
mentioned ten day special examination. The required subjects
included tactics, military history, science of arms, field
and permanent fortifications, military and political
administration and economy, mathematics, artillery, special
geography and geology, staff duty and military jurisprudence.
About one-half of the academic work was elective and the
officer could choose among universal history, universal
geography, logic, physics, chemistry, literature, higher
geodesy, higher mathematics, French and Russian.
By any measure available, the Kriegsakademie was the
premier military institution of its time. It produced about
42

fifty per cent of the military literature of Europe. Foreign
observers marveled at the academy's success in generating
self-reliance, and its ability toward forming and disciplining
the minds of its students. Attendence at the War Academy
became a prerequisite to achieving high rank or General Staff
assignment.
6. Staff Duty
A prime objective of the German military leaders was
to mesh as smoothly as possible the functions of planning and
execution. A natural approach to the solution was the
establishment of divisions of the General Staff linking field
forces and a headquarters staff. The headquarters or "Great
General Staff" was located in Berlin (Grosser Generalstab)
and the remaining staff units assigned to field commands under
41
the terms "Field Forces General Staff" (Truppengeneralstab)
Officers were assigned to either Staff Corps division depending
upon rank, experience and career needs. Staff Officers on
occasion were given command of field armies but the "General
Staff officer was expected always to resist any temptation to
command." One of the most successful military teams in
Prussian history illustrates the role of the staff officer.
Beside the field commander Blucher's racy and somewhat elemental
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Scharnhorst, the quiet man o£ learning, made a strange
contrast, for Scharnhorst was in a way the perfect exemplar
for all Chiefs of Staff, he was par excellence the man who
42
stands in the background, advises, warns and guides.
General Staff officers serving with field commands
carried out their duties as recognized representatives of the
Chief of the General Staff. The usual distribution of
officers assigned to field forces were kept to a minimum: at
least two senior and several junior General Staff officers on
the staff of an army; three to five General Staff officers
for an army corps; and a single General Staff officer for a
d"
• • T" Oivision.
One of the most important parts of the General Staff's
training was the staff journey begun by Scharnhorst. As
early as 1805 he arranged for officers of his brigade to
reconnoiter areas of planned battles or where maneuvers might
44 ^ . . . .
occur. Staff journeys served a dual purpose of minimizing
the isolation between the planner and those who would execute
orders and also updating contact for the Staff officer i^ith
field conditions to guard against a theoretician elite.
An understudy of Scharnhorsts
'
, von Muffling, continued
the Staff journeys and made a major improvement by introducing
Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 39.
43
Ibid., Brewer, p. 161.
44
Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 24.
44

the Kriegspiel, or war game. Once actual conditions of
terrain and geography were determined operational situations
45
were followed through in sandboxes or on maps.
C. ACCOMPLISHMENTS
A review of the history of the evolution of the General
Staff, the training and preparation of its Staff officers
reveals a military institution unparalleled in professionalism.
Three major accomplishments can be seen as a result of the
Prussian and German efforts. Most glaring of the achievements
was the success experienced in the series of spendid little
wars of the mid-1800' s. Prussia neutralized her closest
enemies and maintained a delicate stability in Europe by fear
of its military machine. The military staff effectively
projected its perceptions of needs to a monarch who stood in
awe of his country's might and who rarely opposed military
proposals. General Staff contentions or attempts at being
totally apolitical coupled with weak kings and strong military
leaders resulted in a wresting of control for military planning
and operations from the War Ministry. With unlimited access
to the single decision-maker, military leaders were able to
dictate measures for the industrialization and militarization
of the country. Major commitments of resources, manpower and






arms. The country's push to the development and use o£
railroads and weapons which greatly improved mobilization and
military strength are signs of the military influence in the
running of the country.
This points to the second and third major achievements of
the General Staff system, efficiency of centralization and
continuity. Thoroughly training and educating the professional
officer corps to levels unsurpassed by the remainder of
society, offering a hope of world influence, essentially tied
the future of Prussia to the coattails of the military. The
single channel of communication within the General Staff net-
work directly to an absolute authority facilitated a decision
chain not duplicated anywhere else. This meant that plans
generated by the planning/execution model of the General Staff
Corps, once approved could be implemented almost immediately.
The delegation by the king of much authority in the military
strategy realm to the Chief of the General Staff meant that
a considerable degree of flexibility was effected in the rigid
centralized system.
Continuity of planning, training and operations is a
vital link between war, war preparation and peace. Continuity
in the Prussian/German military sphere was provided by the
network of the highly skilled, dedicated officer corps. Few
changes to the General Staff Corps were made over time, most
changes were made within the officer corps. Rotation of
personnel was held to a minimum to facilitate the development
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of expertise rather than exposure to the ways of war.
Stressing the anonymous, intellectual guidance aspect of
staff duty rather than the ascension to command motivations,
further improved the consistency of quality planning and
enhanced the touch with the theoretical to the operational
requirements of war planning.
D. DRAWBACKS TO THE GENERAL STAFF CONCEPT
Success almost always comes at a price. The efficiency
and dominance of the German General Staff led not only to
great military world status, but eventually to a costly
national defeat in war. Without going into exhaustive detail
on specific hinderances to the rise of German militarism, the
following list can offer some evidence of why the Staff
concept modeled closely after the German General Staff is
not applicable to the present day American military institution.
The list can also allay fears of a similar system arising in
America if certain portions of the Staff concept are
incorporated.
The first and highest price paid is the loss of freedom
accorded citizens under democratic government. Carl von
Clausewitz, one of the most influential military thinkers,
considered democracy to be a "disaster". With few exceptions
the General Staff leaders shuddered at the thought of democracy





"Democracy considered the human personality as a
whole, whereas Prussia only understood the ethics
of duty and of service to the State. "^^
Even the supremacy of the State concept was modified in
desparate situations by von Clausewitz, he taught that
"the existence of the army had priority over that of
the State itself... the principle that consciously or
unconsciously guided the Reichswehr in the years
from 1918-1933. "47
Many nations have a military staff system similar to and
some even predate the German General Staff. A case can be
made for the staff concept not being responsible for the
rise to absolute militarism but that the lack of governmental
controls allowed the rise to military control. It is
inconceiveable that a military-controlled state could emerge
from a democratic, popularly represented society.
It was only when the General Staff was moved from under
the War Ministry's control to direct line with the monarchy
that unbridled militarism commenced. Balances and
decentralization controls in a modern democracy can prevent
uncontrolled excursions of the public will.
Even in view of its apparent successes the German General
Staff witnessed increasing criticism as the size and complexity
of operations increased. The General Staff was responsible
for a relatively small, uncomplicated army by modern standards
Many examples exist of General Staff planners' failure to
Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 63.
Ibid., Goerlitz, p. 63.
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accurately forecast logistical needs. Delays and design
inefficiencies were increasingly common after the General
Staff ordered a weapon to be developed then failed to monitor
progress and allow for lead-time in modifications.
The German General Staff was only successful when a
single branch of the military was involved. Once the
admiralty and Air Force entered service as divisions of the
military, the General Staff predominance began to decline.
Acceptable communications links within the Navy could accommo-
date the Staff Corps system and rapid technological developments
in the air service were difficult to manage under the
48
centralized staff corps concept. Suspicion and competition
between services arose and could not be adequately adjusted
for by the Staff Corps
.
E. CONCLUSION
In spite of many incongruities between the environment in
which the General Staff prospered and the milieu of modern
America, there are a few functions of the Staff Corps concept
that can be applied to the Navy planning process. Included
in these applicable functions are:
1. Specialized education and training for the planning role
2. Increased continuity within the present staff system by
TSWerner Baumback, translated by Frederick Holt, The Life




a) improvements in the personnel rotation cycle;
b) separation o£ command and planning career requirements;
c) building staff geopolitical expertise base (effect
of staff journeys);
d) limiting the planning and execution overlaps.
F. STAFF COMPARISONS OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS
Using the German General Staff history as a point of
reference, the following will be a comparison of more modern
experiences with systems by nations more similar to the
United States. Most see the central proper role of military
in the political arena as a means to an end, not as an end in
itself.
From the perspective of function and status there are
three basic staff types:
1. At the highest level are staffs that operate as
military agencies of a government. Most modern
nations possess some form of supreme or a "national
general staff", which exercises control over the
armed forces. National level staffs are exemplified
by the German "Oberkommando" of World War II, and
the joint Chiefs of Staff system of the United
States.
2. Departmental Staffs exist at the individual service
(Army, Navy, Air Force) level. The function of
departmental staffs is to organize, train, equip
and employ the service forces according to plan and
policy directives.
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Staff responsibilities are assigned by established
defense policies and their limits of operational autonomy-
are dictated by form, strength and urgencies of respective
governments. Many present-day defense institutions are
patterned after the early German General Staff concept. How-
ever, it is imperative that each nation assess its own
security needs, be cognizant of its cultural, political,
fiscal and military constraints then adapt a defense planning
model to its unique characteristics. Examining other adap-
tations to defense planning may offer some insights into
useful or practical improvements in the U.S. Navy planning
system. It is also important to allay fears that might arise
when proposing the application of general staff advantages
to the present Navy system. Reviewing defense controls in
other democratic institutions should serve to reduce concerns
over staff proposals.
1. Israeli
Unique past, threatening environment, defense plans
designed for survival, defense decision-making power in Israel
has traditionally resided with the prime minister and Cabinet.
Two main departments of the Cabinet exert the greatest
influence on defense planning, the Ministries of Foreign
Affairs and Defense. The Minister of Defense has clearly
been the dominant influence, in fact for eighteen of Israel's
first twenty years of existence the prime minister served as
his own defense minister. Although not based in
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constitutional or legal foundation, a tradition was begun
under Ben-Gurion whereby the minister of defense would
concentrate on matters of grand strategy while the Israeli
Defense Forces would deal with operational matters and the
execution of policy.
Without a clear delineation of responsibilities a
basic law passed in 1976 formally assigned command authority
to the government. The minister of defense was given command
over the IDF and was placed in direct line between the IDF
and the Cabinet. The chief of staff of the IDF became
responsible to the minister of defense for all matters. The
minister of defense essentially has become the supreme
commander of the Israeli Defense Forces and has the right to
intervene at any level of the IDF. In spite of this the
defense ministry restricts its primary concentration to
technical and administrative matters (military research and
development, production or procurement of material, and
financial planning and budgeting) . The IDF General Staff
retains responsibility for organization, training and the
planning and execution of military operations.
Early in the development of the State of Israel, a
General Staff was formed, which is today known as the Zahal
or Israeli Defense Force. State security is the concentration
of the Jewish State. With unique threats to its survival
such as being very small, an intruder among many larger enemy
nations, the Israeli needs demanded a focus of all resources
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at hand to match the threat. Any fragmentation of efforts
could prove costly, even fatal. The organizational structure
of the IDF is composed of a General Staff whose permanent
members are the heads of five branches (operations, manpower,
quartermaster, planning and intelligence) ; the commanders of
the armored corps, navy and air force; and the three area
commanders of the ground forces.
The General Staff has control over all IDF branches,
and also exercises authority over more than twenty functional
commands such as artillery, armor and training. The navy and
air force are not considered separate services but do enjoy
a fair degree of autonomy. The three ground force area
commanders are assisted by a deputy and staff officers for
supply, training, manpower and operations and have command
over all installations and combat units in their sector of
area defense.
This decentralization of command is responsible in
large part for the autonomous operations and successes of the
Israeli forces on the battlefield. General Andre Beaufre,
one of France's leading strategic thinkers, pointed to "a
large degree of decentralization of command, and ardent
troops unencumbered by the complex of rigid and inhibited
actions which still prevails all too often in the European
Bard E. O'Neill, "The Defense Policy of Israel", cited
in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti, The Defense Policies
of Nations
,




and American armies," as being prime contributors to Israeli
successes. Israel's preoccupation with security guarantees
is not diminished by civilian- control of the military nor
threatened by potential use of militarism. It is important
that the general staff concept can be civil controlled,
flexible, can manage separate service branches and meet with
modern battlefield successes.
2. United Kingdom
Even though possessing representative forms of
government, the British and American governments differ on
at least one fundamental aspect of the defense planning process
In the British parliamentary system the power of the executive
and legislative branches are "fussed", in contrast to the
American presidential system in which the power of the
52legislative and executive are "separated". In contrast
to America's superpower status, Britain views its role as
more than a mere regional actor, but in any realistic military
assessment the country is a middle-rank European power below
the Federal Republic of Germany and France.
Lacking major threats to its security, Britain is able
to support a system of constructive adversary politics - the




^^Chris L. Jefferies, British Defense Policy: A





"whipping system" - in its defense policy planning. Until
very recently three service bureaucracies, attentive to its
own traditions and priorities, competed for resources under
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central supervision but not effective central authority.
In 1964 a defense reorganization created a small coordinating
defense ministry and three essentially autonomous service
departments (Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry) . This
formed a centralized ministry of defence with a nominally
strong central staff element and three subordinate single-
service management organizations (navy, army and air force
departments). Later a procurement department was added.
Individual departments operate under a loosely managed frame-
work where service officials effectively protect their own
projects and set their own priorities. Top appointed civilian
officials exercise considerable guidance and control over
policies and programs. The "fused" executive and legislative
form of government results in an executive- led defense plan
development process with the House of Commons and several of
its committees maintaining a voice in the debate over primarily
budget considerations. Outright rejection of a defense
-•-
Richard Burt, Defence Budgeting The British and American
Cases
,
(London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Adelphi Papers 112, 1975) p. 4.
David Greenwood, "The Defense Policy of the United
Kingdom," cited in Ibid., Murray and Viotti, p. 197.
55 Ibid., Greenwood, p. 208.
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proposal by the House of Commons essentially results in a
call for reelection of the government.
3. France
France is a global middle power with substantial
regional influence. It is the third-ranking world nuclear
and naval power with impressive ground and air capabilities.
As a nation not directly threatened and seeking an independent
role in world politics, France has developed a defense planning
system designed primarily to self-guard the security of France
without allied assistance. However, the planning system can
accommodate joint military operations should a threat arise
that cannot be handled by French forces.
Responsibility for defense matters is constitutionally
and practically a matter of primary concern for the French
president. The National Assembly, the legislative branch of
government, lacks any real capacity for opposing executive
branch defense proposals.
"The French (defense policy) process has much more in
common with the centralized, secretive, executive-dominated
British system. .. than with the pluralistic (Merican System).
Formulation of French defense policy is decidedly
centralized, implementation of defense plans is not. The
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^^Alan Ned Sabrosky, "The Defense Policy of France,"
cited in Ibid., Murray and Viotti, p. 231.
David S. Yost, "French Defense Budgeting: Persistent
Constraints and Future Prospects," p. 35 as cited in Ibid.,
Murray and Viotti, p. 244.
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structure of the French defense institution is very similar
in organization to that of the United States. Implementation
of the French defense plan is relegated to the General
Secretariat of National Defense (much like the National
Security Council of the US) and the ministry of National
Defense (similar to the US Department of Defense) . A chief
of staff system has primary responsibility for the operation
of the armed forces. Each individual service (army, navy,
air force) has a chief of staff. The Committee of the Chiefs
of Staff are headed by an armed forces chief of staff who
has overall responsibility for the readiness of the French
armed forces in peacetime. In wartime, he becomes Chief of
the General Staff, with three service chiefs available as his
deputies for specific operations.
G. CORPORATE STRATEGIC PLANNING
General Robert E. Wood, when chief executive of Sears,
Roebuck and Company, said, "Business is like a war in one
respect, if its grand strategy is correct, any number of
tactical errors can be made and yet the enterprise proves
successful .
"
Formal strategic planning first appeared in the business
world in the mid-1950' s. The new planning systems first only
re
A.D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structures : Chapters
in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise
,
(Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1962} p. 235.
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introduced long-range planning as a courier to planning for
a given project. More and more firms began to tie their
future estimates and decision criteria to five-year and
one-year time frames.
The corporate strategic planning framework, in spite of
vast motivation and objectives differences, offer a sub-
stantial array of useful applications to military strategic
planning. The objective of corporate planning is tied to
the maximization of profits. It is motivated by the increase,
maintenance or minimization of loss of its share in the market
place. Survival of the business enterprise is an objective
of planning but there are alternatives to survival. Operations
at a profit loss can be tolerated for a period of time in the
business while capital improvements are made, external economy
difficulties persist or while assets are shifted to profitable
endeavors prior to disbanding the business interest. Complete
failure of a corporation is for most, a temporary setback.
For military strategic planning, any plan that might result
in red ink on the military ledger is unacceptable. One under-
estimation, particularly in the nuclear age, can be fatal.
Military planners are forced to operate under the motto that
59
there is no alternative to survival.
^"g
For an overall view of the developments that have taken
place in the corporate business environment in strategic
planning, the reader may find the following suggestions
definitive and representative: Kenneth R. Andrews, The
Concept of Corporate Strategy, Irwin, 1980., Jay R. Gaibraith
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A disparity in planning systems produced by the difference
in motivation of private (gain-seeking corporations) and
public sector organizations can afford the luxury of testing
various options, estimating needs and calculating projected
costs and ultimately whether the corporation will continue
to exist. A trial run for a new product line, a marketing
technique or diversification can be made on a small scale to
measure results and project larger scale outcomes, without
jeopardizing the corporation or the marketplace. The
invaluable feedback loop from suboptimized results to the
planner for larger scale strategy is another advantage not
often available to the military strategic planner.
First and foremost, the military planning process must
operate, it cannot choose to stop. It is inconceivable that
a nation willingly, deliberately would surrender its security
requirements. Military strategic planning is directed
primarily at the winning and preparing for war. Trial-runs
of wartime operations can only be approximated by training
exercises and simulations. No direct feedback relating
and Daniel A. Nathanson, Strategy Implementation: the role
of structure and process
,
West, 197 8. , Charles W. Hofer and
Dan Schendel, Strategy Formulation: Analytical Concepts , West,
1978., William R. King and David I . Cleland, Strategic Planning
and Policy
,
Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1978., Ian C. MacMilian,
Strategy Formulation: Political Concepts
,
West, 1978., Robert
G. Murdick, et al.. Business Policy
,
Grid, 1976., George A.
Steiner, Strategic Planning
,
Free Press, 1979., H. Uyterhorven,
et al.. Strategy and Organization, Irwin 1977.
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enemy responses is available to the military planner for
modification or adaption of future plans to future needs.
Even with major ends and means differences between the
private and public sector planning environments, certain
correlations exist in the areas of the implementation,
adaptation development of a planning system to the organi-
zation requirements. A variety of ways are espoused to
accomplish strategic planning in the corporate world. The
following typify the current approaches to methods of planning
1. Committee - a committee process which involves the
utilization of representative from various line and
staff units throughout the organization to accomplish
the planning. Experts from various parts of the
organization assemble under the management appointed
chairman but the responsibility for planning rests
with the total committee membership. Since the
committee will have broad organizational membership,
a corporate view arises out of committee deliberations.
No one corporate position is responsible for the
results of the strategic planning.
2. Separate Staff Function - A separate staff function
to accomplish strategic planning has several major
drawbacks. If responsibility for strategic planning
is left solely to the staff, line management will be
cut out. Responsibility is given to a staff unit,
even though it is staffed with very competent people
and reports at a top management level, it will not
produce the type of results the firm needs. A major
area of uncertainty lies in having to make difficult
judgements involving major allocations of scarce
resources
.
3. Line or Business Unit Management - Effective strategic
planning should usually be accomplished by either
line management or business unit management in large,
diversified companies. Line management must be
involved in this process to ensure both that the
assumptions upon which these plans are built are
reasonable and that the plans can be executed. Line
management must make sure that the plan is eventually
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carried out. There is no substitute for line
management's accepting and supporting the planning
process.
4. Top Management - Strategic planning is a top
management responsibility. However, generally
they should not be the only ones to engage in it.
5. Outside Consultant - Strategic planning in a firm
can be aided by an outside consultant. Professional
personnel who have seen a variety of systems can
often provide very sound advice on experiences in
similar situations. Using outside consultants to
initially introduce strategic planning can be
especially useful. Many times a firm will find it
necessary to go outside the firm for consultants to
deal with a particularly difficult problem of
environmental analysis.
6. Task Force - When a problem of strategic consequence
arises, a task force will be assembled. ^^
Later discussions will center on the types of methods
employed by the Navy in the past to meet its strategic planning
needs. Certainly no single approach can adequately incorporate
the myriad of variables in naval planning and produce a
feasible, acceptable long-range plan. Differing planning
requirements at various levels of naval command perhaps
suggests that a combination of approaches is in order.
Examining Navy planning requirements in light of the above
corporate planning approaches may offer suggestions for
modification of the Navy planning system or confirm the
adequacy of the present system.
James B. Whittaker, Strategic Planning in a Rapidly
Changing Environment
,
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,
D.C. Heath and Company, 1978) p. 9-13.
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Basic assumptions of corporate strategic planning, apart
from the aforementioned methodologies, may also prove
applicable to Navy planning. One theme of the corporate
world suggests that top management must be involved in order
for planning to meet future goals. Taking into account the
realization that top management, particularly in a large
organization, cannot accomplish all the strategic planning
that is required various strata of assistants will be a
necessity. Delineation of each groups responsibility in this
planning process can be crucial to the success of planning
efforts. It is essential to the adaptation of a planning
system to any organization that a comprehensive, honest
analysis of the planning needs, assets, constraints of the
organization be made to ensure that the system in use or
projected is as closely matched to the requirements as is
possible. This analysis can be performed using personnel
within the organization or consultants contracted from out-
side the firm. After the installation of the suitable
planning system, reexamination will be necessary periodically
to ensure that the planning network is adjusting to a changing
environment or to recommend modifications that would likely
match demands.
Attempts to tailor any corporate strategic planning
approaches to public or military planning must make accommo-
dations for the size and complexity of the public sector.
Differences between the two organizational entities are very
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real. The dispersion o£ power across the entire population
concentrated tenuously in the political leadership compli-
cates the dimension of the governmental planning apparatus.
Successful corporate strategies can undoubtedly not be
transferred directly to public application; even transformation
may not be suitable.
"In our democratic society, planning by government takes
place within a political milieu. The separation of
powers, checks and balances and periodic elections are
key factors influencing the political environment. In
a democratic political process, strategic planning tends
to be much more open than it is in business, with many
persons and groups involved. The results become much le
less predictable. When legislation is involved, for
example, 435 members of the House of Representatives and
100 Senators potentially have a voice in the final
decision. To a large extent, congressmen view legis-
lative proposals from the point of view of their local
constituents which may not always be optimum for the
nation as a whole. "^1
Consensus-building and political adversity are magnified in
the public sector and severely constrain efforts to reach
widely acceptable agreements.
Applications of corporate strategies have been attempted
in the public sector with varying degrees of success.
Humphrey- Javits Bill introduced in 1975 sought to apply a
proven business practice to government that of establishing
detailed objectives in an overall comprehensive economic plan.
The bill failed to pass and it is widely accepted that it
Michael H. Moskow, Strategic Planning in Business and




probably would not have been effective. Comments from the
private sector point to lessons learned in the past by the
business world could have forestalled its failure.
1. Recognition that strong commitment accross the spectrum
is required.
2. Changes must be gradual
3. Top management must have a clear understanding of the
purposes of the system and how it is to be implemented.
4. "great care should be taken to insure that concern
over techniques does not divert planners and managers
from the fundamental purposes of planning. If this
is not done, the manipulation of numbers becomes more
important than their meaning. Formal procedures and
rituals drive out the creativity, innovation and
imagination needed for effective planning. Although
this course is not inevitable, it has been followed
by government PPB systems in the past. "^2
Reviewing the path already followed by corporate management
in devising strategic systems, even though operating on a much
smaller, less complex scale than to structure the problem and
identify pitfalls than the direct application of methods. Both
organizations suffer from personal turnovers, but business can
minimize its effects when personnel shift within the company
rather than having a major turnover as the government does
periodically. Both the public and private sectors with
divisions of labor in strategic planning is the responsibility
of top leadership. But since assistance is required to meet
planning needs it becomes important where the limits of
responsibility between decision-maker and staff are established.
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''George A. Steiner, Strategic Planning
,
(New York: The
Free Press Inc., 1979) p. 331-332.
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A clarifying caution witnessed in the corporate world may be
enlightening:
"The planning staff must play only a substantive; facili-
tative role in providing forecasts, assumptions, alterna-
tive strategies, etc., to be considered by the manager-planners,
If they try to play the planning cultural role of the chief
executive, they may well be viewed as "technocrats with
a cause." Then they, like the efficiency experts, operations
researchers, and host of others before them, will be
relegated to the back room of the organization, and their
cause will not play a significant role in determining the
organization's destiny. "o3
Another, though certainly not the last useful application
of corporate knowledge to the public sector, is a forewarning
about the pace at which changes should be made. Experiences
in the corporate world reveal that the precepts of strategic
planning are difficult to translate into practice.
"Not only is the translation difficult, but attempts to
install rigorous strategic discipline typically run into
'resistance to planning' - an organizational 'enertia' -
commonly referred to as an anti-planning bias."^'^
Once an organizational agreement is reached that a need for
strategic planning exists and a proposed strategic planning
system is accepted, the pace of implementation of the system
should be measured and accommadating. Knowledgeable management
strategists recommend, 'make haste slowly.'
K^
David I. Cleland and William R. King, Strategic Planning
and Policy
,
(New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 19 7 8 3
p. 284.
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III. AMERICAN NAVAL STRATEGIC PLANNING
In order to move forward with a proposal for a change
(improvements) in the Navy's strategic planning it is
encumbent upon those who would propose a change to have first
measured the modification against past efforts. To suggest
a change to an existing system should not be judged as a
criticism of that system. The Navy's history reveals an
unfailing service to the nation. It has more than met its
obligations and has been prepared for any response when
called. The Navy's planning system has worked well in the
past and continues to work very well today. If a suggestion
for minor changes can produce any improvements in the
effectiveness of the system then any effort toward that end
is worthwhile.
A. THE NAVY DEPARTMENT
The U.S. Navy was founded on October 13, 177 5. For the
next eighty years it was engaged in naval operations but the
United States remained relatively safe from invasion and
occupied itself primarily with the consolidation and
development of its vast western land masses.
William Crowe, "Western Strategy and Naval Missions
Approaching the Twenty First Century," ed. James L. George,
Problems of Sea Power as We Approach the Twenty-First Century
,
(Washington D, C. : American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1978) p. 14.
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Naval matters of the fledgling United States of America
were handled by the Secretary of War until 27 April, 1798,
when the creation of the Department of the Navy was authorized.
It began to operate at Philadelphia under Benjamin Stoddert.
The Navy had one ship at sea and three under construction.
Secretary Stoddert could count on both hands the total personnel
and ships of the Department of the Navy.
"This was the static eighteenth century when naval warfare,
both in methods and in instruments, remained virtually
unchanged generation after generation. If a warship's
wooden hull remained sound, she stayed in service 40, or
even 60 years, just about as good as the latest product
of the shipyards. Not only from year to year, but also
from nation to nation, the static uniformity prevailed;
a captured vessel could be instantly absorbed into a fleet
with none of today's technical complications. The con-
structors and taxpayers had it easier also, a still sound
ship did not have to be replaced with a bigger and better
one made obsolescent in international competition by
technical innovations. The unchanging methods of handling
ships and fighting them, likewise, made it more comfortable
for those who commanded and manned them; what one learned
as a midshipman still held good when one became a captain
or an admiral. A further factor that made administration
easy was the similarity between warships and merchantmen.
In hulls, masts, sails and rigging, the smaller warships
differed little from the larger trading vessels, which
carried guns too, allowing quick conversion for war
purposes . "67
Primarily concerned with "showing the flat" the newly
formed Navy, however, found itself engaged in war ten of its
first seventeen years. The infant Navy distinguished itself
Frost H. Holloway, History of the Modern United States
Navy
,
(Annapolis, MD. : U.S. Naval Institute, iyZ9j p. 1Z«.
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against the French in the guasi war (1798-1801) and in the
Barbary Wars (1801-1805). However, it was unable to handle
the British fleet in 1812. Often the Navy found itself
serving as an extension of the Department of State when in
foreign ports. Administrative and logistic functions
remained simple until the need for coal demanded wide-ranging
port and outlet arrangements.
1. The Bureau System
Strong administrative leadership, knowledgeable in
Naval affairs was becoming more a necessity. Just one week
before peace was made with Britain, Congress created a "Board
of Navy Commissioners, "commonly called the Navy Board.
Professional Naval officers were, for the first time, given
a share of the administrative responsibility of the Navy. The
next century and a half would witness adjustments to the
balance between ultimate civilian authority and professional
military experience. Major incremental changes in this
adjustment process occurred in two pairs of dates just a
century apart, 1815 and 1842, and 1915 and 1942. The settle-
ment in 1815 was interpreted by Secretary Benjamin W.
Crowninshield such that he retained "military" functions of
operations and personnel with the professional military
limited to "civil material and logistical functions." This
arrangement would plague the Navy for years but matters were
made even worse by the Board's attempt to collectively handle
all business even to the minute. Responsibility for any
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naval discrepancy could not be traced to any Board member
resulting in a criticism of "what was everybody's business
became nobody's business."
Some relief from this situation was realized in 1842
by the creation of the bureau system. Patterned by Congress
after the War Department system, the bureau system became a
valuable and permanent addition to the naval establishment.
The original bureaus of 1842 were Yards and Docks, Ordnance,
Construction and Repair, Medicine and Surgery, and Provisions
and Clothing. In 1862, the bureaus of Navigation (later
Naval Personnel)
,
(Steam) Engineering and Equipment were
added. In 1921, Aeronautics was added; in 1940, Construction
and Repair merged with Engineering to'become the Bureau of
Ships
.
The matter of civilian control by secretaries who
lack naval experience and knowledge worsened after 1818.
Prior to this time attempts were made to appoint secretaries
who at least superficially had some connection with shipping,
however. Cabinet posts much as diplomatic assignments became
part of the spoils system. This coupled with Secretary
Crowninshield' s action of 1815 whereby responsibility for
operational control - the making of war plans and the "calling
For a personal account of service both on the General
Board and within the Bureau system consult, Seaton Schroeder,
A Half Century of Naval Service
,
(New York: D. Appleton and




of signals" when war came - remained in the hands of
inexperienced civilian secretaries. This untenable arrangement
would remain until 1915.
As the bureau system was being implemented, the "naval
revolution," transition from wood and sail to steel and steam
69
was getting underway. Engine technology eclipsed Navy
capabilities and private industry became the main supplier of
engines, while Navy yards still produced hulls. Steam warships
ushered in a period of greater complexity; not only could the
Navy not build steam engines, but its officers did not know
how to operate and repair them. Besides overseas refueling
bases and other logistics problems, steam raised the question
of strategic cruising radius since warships could not remain
at sea indefinitely as in sailing days. Specialization
became more and more imbedded in the Navy fabric.
Foundations for a full-dress battle fleet were laid
in 1890, as the Navy shifted from its dependence on coast-
defense vessels. The Navy helped to make the United States
a world power in 1898 by defeating the Spanish squadrons in
a colonial war. Prestige for the Navy increased along with
increase in its size and number of warships but under its
awkward system of management it was characterized as "being
well-organized for everything except war." Several efforts
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Navy
,
(New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., iy6ZJ p. liU-iii.
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were made to establish a board of line officers to give
professional direction to the planning and control of naval
operations, but none survived Congress. Fear of total
military control was a factor in the proposal's failure to
pass.
2. Ad Hoc Planning
Over the short history of the U.S. Navy, it had not
established a professional military advisory group capable
of advising its civilian secretaries during wartime. During
the War of 1812, Navy Secretary William Jones found the Navy
Department to be unprepared for strategic planning and the
effective direction of wartime operations. He sought ad hoc
advice from individual naval officers which resulted in
conflicting opinions and ships departing port without definite
70
sailing directions. Later in the war, Secretary Jones
reported
:
"The multifarious concerns of the naval establishment,
the absence of whole regulations in its civil adminis-
tration, and the imperfect execution of duties due to
want of professional experience, lead to confusion
and abuse. "'^-'-
Again when the United States was enmeshed in the Civil
War the only professional inputs to decisions concerning the
Edwin B. Hooper, The Navy Department: Evolution and
Fragmentation
,
(Washington D.C. : *The Naval Historical
Foundation, 19 78) p . 4
.
71John D. Long, The New American Navy
,
(New York: The




employment of naval forces were in the form of ad hoc advice. "
A tradition of sorts was begun during the Spanish-American
War by the establishment of a Board of Strategy. The Board,
which included Alfred Thayer Mahan as a member, was set up
to advise the Navy Secretary on the conduct of operations.
The Board was an ad hoc approach to professional military
advice to decision-makers during the war. This trend has
continued where planning processes during peace time are found
to be unsuitable for wartime. Therefore, at the crucial
juncture where war preparation continues but intensifies to
war fighting, a reorganization of the planning procedure is
begun.
The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the
first major effort by the Navy to establish a more long-range
view of its planning requirements. On 13 March, 1900, the
73General Board was created by General Order 544. Its
purpose was to advise the Secretary of the Navy on what was
necessary to "insure the efficient preparation of the fleet
in case of war and for the naval defense of the coast." For
the first fifteen years of its existence the Board was in-
volved in originating and coordinating nearly all planning
in the Navy. The Board was primarily concerned with reviewing
war and defense planning done at the Naval War College,
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planning the location of naval bases and determining the
number, kind, disposition and military characteristics of
ships. Even though its duties were purely advisory in nature,
the Board under Admiral of the Navy George Dewey generated
the policies and guidance for overall ship building programs
for the next five years. The building plans were not fully
implemented but did produce a blueprint for future plans.
As the world status of America and the complexity of
military coordination grew a requirement for joint Army and
Navy planning became apparent. In July 1903, the Joint Army-
Navy Board was established. A forerunner of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the Joint Army-Navy Board coordinated the preparation
of the famous "color" plans which served as the basis of
American strategy through the late 1930s by melding the
inputs from the Navy Board and Army General Staff. When the
post of Chief of Naval Operations was created, responsibility
for the preparation of war plans shifted to the CNO's staff -
OpNav. The Navy Board continued to review war plans and
advised the Secretary of the Navy as requested.
The drive for more effective overall line control
continued and in 1915 Congress created the post of the Chief
of Naval Operations. Sponsors of the change foresaw real
Jack D. Nicholas, George B. Pickett, and William 0.
Spears Jr. , The Joint and Combined Staff Officer's Manual
,
(Harr isburg , Pa. : The Stackpole Company, 1959J p~. TT.
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powers of direction, but the combination of a strong
Secretary of the Navy and a less forceful first CNO meant
that initial expectations would not be met. A year later,
Congress added an Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
(referred to as OpNav) . With a wide range of functions
concentrated under OpNav, improvements in the systematic
planning and coordinating service were evident. However,
yet to be resolved was the lack of direct control of the CNO
over fleet operational commands nor any direct authority
over bureaus and offices of the Navy Department.
During the first thirty- two years of its existence
the Navy Board essentially served as the high command of the
Navy. The Director of Naval Intelligence, the President of
the Naval War College and from 1915 to 1932 the CNO and the
Commandant of the Marine Corps served as official members of
the Navy Board. Because its membership consisted of the
senior uniformed policy makers, the Navy Board generated
great influence and authority by its policy statements in
spite of its advisory nature. This advisory channel resulted
from the release of Board members from administrative and
operational duties, but still lacking was any executive
authority. In 1932, all official members of the Navy Board
were removed and the Board suffered a loss in its authority.
Reestablished with its membership composed of three to five
Rear Admirals, one or more Captains and a Commander as
executive secretary, the Navy Board continued to contribute
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significantly as an advisory group to the Secretary of the
Navy until 1945.
During the interwar years the Navy Board developed
all of the yearly building programs and reviewed the charac-
teristics of all new warships and support units. With the
exception of a review cycle in the development of major war
plans, particularly war plan ORANGE against Japan, the Navy
Board concentrated on position papers regarding Naval mobi-
lization, ship and aircraft innovations, arms limitations
agreements of the 1920 's and 1930' s. The Board was the
primary contributor to the Two Ocean Navy Building Program
of 1929-1940. With emphasis on force composition rather than
employment and deployment and strategic operational aspects,
the Board remained an advisory service to the Secretary of
the Navy and less an integral part of the operational Navy
planning system.
Several external constraints, namely arms limitations
agreements, tight Navy budgets and fears of an approaching
global war resulted in a major drawback of the Board, limited
long-range view of planning. Its relatively limited time
horizons restricted projections to less than a decade into
the future. In spite of this, the Board generated what was
to become far more coherent and effective guidance for Naval
forces and strategies than would be witnessed in the postwar
years. The Navy maintained control of its own budget through
1947 which greatly facilitated the Navy's control over its
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own force composition and strategic direction. After the
loss of management authority of its own funds, the Navy has
seen an increased hampering of its long-range planning. That
is not likely to change. Annual budget review cycles
effectively shunt any long-term perspective to planning.
Adherence to or development of a viable long-range strategy
which is specific enough to be useful is almost precluded by
being at the mercy of budget cycles, executive branch turnovers
and congressional shifts.
3. Planning Reorganization for War
Again war brought about another very significant change
to the naval establishment. In March, 1942, "a fundamental
step resulted in the greatest concentration of military
75
authority in the history of the Navy Department." Admiral
Ernest J. King was appointed Commander in Chief of the United
States Fleet with his headquarters not on a distant flagship
but in the Navy Department Building. This combined operational
command as Commander in Chief with the departmental control
7 (S
of the Chief of Naval Operations post. Controlling two
separate staffs. Admiral King personified responsibility in
77
the military arena. The power and influence of the General
Board diminished considerably as the shift in emphasis of
75
Ibid., Albion, p. 17.
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Ibid., Hooper, p. 14-15.
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A detailed view of the division of responsibility and
individuals serving in leadership positions in the reorganized
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of planning was subsumed to war fighting objective under
Admiral King.
With the increase in authority gained by the new
position came the establishment of different channels of
communication between the military and civilian leadership.
In his role as Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King was
responsible directly to the Secretary of the Navy. As the
Commander in Chief of the US Fleet he was responsible directly
to the President and in general to the Secretary. Overall,
strategic military direction of the war was maintained by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, composed of Admiral King, the
Chief of Staff of the Army, Commanding General of the Army
Air Forces and Admiral William D. Leahy in the new post of
Chief of Staff to the President as Commander in Chief.
Postwar planning for the Navy was conducted by a
special section of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
The special planning section was tasked with identifying the
underlying assessments of future requirements and objectives
as well as a plan for a force structure to meet the
objectives. The postwar planning group only functioned from
1943 through 1945. Its task was taken over in November 1945
by the various planning divisions created by the reorganization
Navy system and its influence on postwar planning consult,
Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U»S» Navy ,
1945-1946
,
(Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North




of OPNAV. Under the Chief of Naval Operations, several
deputy CNO divisions assumed responsibility for plans involving
their particular divisions. Among the more prominent planning
divisions were the DCNO (Operations) COP-03) and his Strategic
Plans Division COP-30), the DCNO (Logistics) (OP-04) and his
Logistics Plans Division (OP-40), and the DCNO (Air) (OP-05)
with his Aviation Plans Division (OP- 50).
By this time, however, the impact of the establishment
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1942 was being felt by the
NaA/y. Navy plans became subject to the guidance of higher
military council. Even though the Navy did not submit its
plans to the JCS for review and approval, as the Army did,
the assumptions of the roles and missions upon which the
Navy's postwar plans were based came under attack by the
JCS. Arguments generated by the individual services views
of its postwar missions were to result in major changes to
79
the military structure of the United States. So conflictual
in fact were the views that the postwar plans developed in
OPNAV proved to be influential for less than t;\^o years.
Sweeping changes brought about the creation of the
National Military Establishment of 1947 permanently altered
the Navy's way of conducting its affairs. For the first time
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This transition in the planning responsibility is very
well documented in Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and
the United States Navy, 1945-1946
,
(Chapel Hill, NC : The
University of North Carolina Press , 1966).
^^Ibid., Pratt, p. 322-323.
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Navy planners were required to submit their input to a joint
Army-Navy budget proposal, which further intensified the
interservice rivalry. The particulars surrounding the points
of contention between the services is outside the scope of
this study. Very briefly, though, the roles and missions
controversy primarily involved the delineation of responsi-
bilities for aviation units of the Army Air Forces and the
Navy. Before the separation of the Army and its Air Force
component was determined, the Army and Navy had both made
their respective postwar force assessments, requirements and
plans without any collaboration or correlation of efforts
between the two services. Adding a third competing service
to the military arena only complicated the issues. Unification
of the services under one Secretary and Department of Defense
was seen as a way of coordinating the military resources of
the nation. Unification further restricted the Navy's autonomy
by reducing its immediate civilian authority from a Cabinet
rank to an understudy of the Secretary of Defense.
The fiscal austerity policies of the Truman Adminis-
tration combined with the continuing controversy over roles
8 n
and missions, essentially reduced Navy postwar plans to the
°^Herman S. Wouk, "Independence and Responsibility: USAF
in the Defense Establishment," and Robert W. Coakley, "The
Army Since Unification: An Old Institution in a New
Environment," ed. Paul R. Schratz, Evolution of the American
Military Establishment Since World War IT^ (Lexington, Va.
:
George C. Marshall Research Foundation Publication, 1978)
p. 40-41 and 60-61.
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point of being meaningless. "Long-range planning by all the
services was nearly non-existent at this time. Estimates were
provided regularly with respect to the long-term impact of
such new technology as the atomic bomb and the guided missile,
and long-range geopolitical forecasts were also prepared on a
sporadic basis by both the services and the Joint Chiefs.
Two long-range war plans were undertaken by the JCS as well:
CHARTIOTEER in 1947 and DROPSHOT in 1948-49. Neither was
approved as a basis for long-term force planning, although
Navy efforts to develop force structures for 1955 were
O
1
prepared in connection with the CHARIOTEER plan.
The period of fiscal austerity between 1947 and 1950
was followed by expansion in the defense budget from 1951-
1954 as force levels were rising to meet the demands of the
Korean War and the heightened Cold War. Navy plans for this
rearmament were developed during 1950 and reflected an effort
to meet immediate needs based on emergency situations over
the next four years. Planning for a four year period was
made possible by the formalization of the global fears
expressed in NSC 68/4 of December 1950. "No long-range
planning organization existed in the United States Navy
8 2during this time." The possible urgings of CNO, Admiral
St
The Maritime Balance Study The Navy Strategic Planning
Experiment
,
(Washington D.C. : Office of the Chiet o± Navai






Forrest Sherman, prompted the Secretary o£ the Navy, Francis
Matthews, to abolish the General Board in 1951.
The only Navy originated long-range planning endeavor
of the early 1950' s was a set o£ strategic estimates prepared
in the Strategic Studies Branch o£ OP- 30. That branch was
established in 1952 by the new Director of the Strategic Plans
Division, Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke. In that same year, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff implemented a program which called for
the preparation of a five-year Joint Strategic Objective
Plan (JSOP) and a fifteen-year Joint Long Range Strategic
Estimate (JLRSE) . The JSOP, in particular, provided a blue-
print for force level planning for all services and delineated
the bounds within which the Navy's future was plotted.
As the Korean War wound down the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration reinstated a program of economy in the national defense
budget. Though constrained by budget limitations the Navy
was allowed the autonomy to establish its own force composition,
In 1954, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Robert B.
Carney, created an ad hoc committee which in 1955, produced
the Navy's first independent, workable plan for the long-term
maintenance of its force levels since World War II. The
committee was titled the Ad Hoc Committee to Study Long Range
Shipbuilding Plans and Programs and was chaired by Vice
Admiral Ralph A. Ofstie. It was charged with preparing a
study that would: "crystallize thinking on the nature of
future naval operations sufficiently to provide a firm basis
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for annual shipbuilding programs. Long-range strategic
concepts and prospective technical developments are indicated
as among the factors likely to determine the nature of
8 3future naval warfare."
Three study groups were established to provide dates
in support of the Navy's first examination of its task force
composition since World War II. One group was to analyze the
capabilities and responsibilities of Naval Striking Forces,
carrier task forces, including antisubmarine, convoy and
escort forces, and amphibious forces. The Strategic Plans
Division COP-60) was requested to provide a strategic estimate
of military tasks and Navy responsibilities for the future.
The Chief of Naval Research was requested to assess the
technological state-of-the-art practicably achievable in
various fields over the next ten to fifteen years by the
United States, its allies and its prospective enemies, while
a civilian staff member was to develop the general study plan,
lay out the tasks to be performed and advise Admiral Ofstie.
Captain (Rear Admiral selectee) Charles D. Griffin was assigned
by his old shipmate Admiral Arleigh Burke to coordinate the
work of the study groups and prepare the overall report,
Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the
Navy
,
(Washington D.C. : Naval Research Advisory Committee,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Engineering and Systems), 1979) p. 31-32.
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Admiral Griffin was the only member of the study team to work
full time on the study.
Twenty months were required to complete the report
and some very important projections of shipbuilding
requirements, nuclear propulsion and equipment conversions
were presented for the Navy of the future. Perhaps equally
important was an assessment of the U.S. military posture from
1960 to 1970. In terms of its present-day Navy the final
report produced a significant statement of Navy philosophy,
it summarized current Navy thinking and plotted a course for
the Navy of the future. Based on less than optimistic
assessments of growing Soviet military strength, increasing
American vulnerabilities and the Navy's capability to meet
increasing security demands, the shipbuilding and force
objectives outline proved to be very ambitious. Economically,
the study was very near its targets estimating level 2 billion
per year for shipbuilding. Technologically, however, the
study called for the adoption and incorporation of new tech-
nological advancements that proved to be beyond feasible limits
Even though the study provided a realistic estimate of
the Navy's future and the minimum requirements necessary to
meet projected needs it was in fact, just a beginning,
"...the shipbuilding proposals put forward were more an amalga-
mation of projects favored by the various committee members
and their offices than a fully coordinated and focused plan.
Even the committee recognized that the report primarily would
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serve as an. effective starting point for continuous review
and revision. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh
A. Burke, accepted this reservation as well, and while he
approved the report for planning purposes, he noted that the
long-range objectives it proposed would be considered only
where appropriate in mid-range and annual programs. Annual
review and revision of the long-range projections would become
the task of the Long Range Objectives Group (OP- 93).
This committee's success prompted the establishment
of OP- 93, the Long Range Objectives Group which began
functioning in 1956. OP-93 was responsible for the bulk of
the Navy's long-range planning through the 1960's.
The Long Range Objectives Group was tasked with
advising the Chief of Naval Operations on developments over
the next fifteen years in technology, strategy, and the Navy's
requirements and the methods and weapons necessary to meet
those capabilities. It was to generate the overall Navy
strategic concepts and devise the plan and optimum weapons
mix to fulfill its future role.
"In addition to preparing its own studies, OP-93 was
to enlist the assistance of scientists and other experts on
o
Chief of Naval Operations to Chairman, Standing Committee
Long Range Shipbuilding and Conversion Plan, Serial 0019P93,
3 March 1956, Technical Reference Room Microfilm Collection,
Center for Naval Analysis. Cited in Ibid., Historical




permanent study groups or special projects. Its central task
was to prepare an integrated annual statement o£ Navy guide-
lines and priorities for force levels, weapons development,
and the introduction of new strategic applications and warfare
techniques. It was to be located in the Pentagon, directed
by a Rear Admiral, and staffed by three Captains, one Marine
Colonel, one Navy Lieutenant, a civilian scientist, plus the
four to seven civilian analysts in its associated Naval
Warfare Analysis Group (NAVWAG) . The Long Range Objectives
Group was expected to serve as the equivalent of a Navy Rand
Corporation, and NAVWAG did perform an operations research
8 5function similar to that of its Air Force counterpart."
Admiral Burke remembered well the uncertainties which
plague long-range planners from his experiences in the
General Board and in the Strategic Plans Division. Just as
importantly he recognized the need for long-range planning
and set about organizing OP-93 and staffing it with the
brightest officers available. The first four directors
between 1955 and 1963, Charles D. Griffin, Roy L. Johnson,
Horacio Rivero and Thomas H. Moorer, all achieved four star
rank. Admiral Moorer became CNO and Admiral Rivero reached
Vice CNO.
The most important task of OP-93 was the production
of an annual Long Range Objectives Statement (LRO). The
"83—
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Ibid., Maritime Balance Study, p. A-9
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second LRO in 1958 became the first official Navy document to
establish a plan for a true long-range force level the
fleet ballistic missile submarine (forty as compared to the
six in production) • Again the significance attached to a
long-range plan resulted from the exigency of an external
threatening situation; it was a response to Soviet development
of an ICBM. The LRO of 1958, a very significant Navy statement
entitled "The Navy of the 1970 Era" was ultimately the only
OP-93 document to be signed off by the CNO to the Secretary
of the Navy as a recommendation for future planning and ship-
O fl
building programs. A supplemental statement to the LRO from
OP-93 was called for by Admiral Burke, the Long Range
Requirements Study (LRR) . It was established to formulate
internal policy and force level goals and define the course
for Navy research and development. Only produced once in
1960, the LRR-60 project was deemed nearly useless since it
did not take into account any funding limitations. The LRO
continued to serve as the first step in planning guidance for
mid-range plans and as a general guideline for the preparation
of annual shipbuilding and procurement programs. Reduced to
jrr
The LRO of 1958, a very significant Navy statement
entitled "The Navy of the 1970 Era" was ultimately the only
OP-93 document to be signed off by the CNO to the Secretary
of the Navy as a recommendation for future planning and ship-
building programs. Ibid., Historical perspectives in Long -




the "secret" classification the LRO could be distributed to
fleet users and it became a more realistic projection by the




Major reorganization efforts became necessary for the
Navy's planning process to accommodate the detailed analysis
of Secretary of Defense McNamara 's budget programs. Intro-
duction of the Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) and the
institution of Planning, Programming and Budgeting System
(PPBS) required greater attention to in-depth analysis and
time-conscious precision than could be expected by the long-
range study group approach. In October 1963, the Long-Range
Objectives Group was shifted to the newly established Office
of Navy Program Planning COP-090) from its more prominent
position within the immediate office of the Chief of Naval
Operations. Rather than reporting to the Vice CNO the
director of OP-93 now reported to the director of OP-090.
The Naval Warfare Advisory Group was moved to OP- 91, the
Division of Naval Warfare Analysis.
Soon after the reorganization the LRO became the MRO,
the Mid- Range Objectives Statement. The MRO was not intended
I
S7 Chief of Naval Operations to the Distribution List,
Subject: Long Range Studies, Serial 18P93, 17 February 1949,
in Folder "5400, Long Range Planning Studies Project, "Naval
War College Central Files, Naval Historical Collection, Naval
War College. Cited in Ibid., Historical Perspectives in
Long-Range Planning in the Navy^ pT! TS~!
87

a definition of naval responsibilities nor point out the
strategic or policy implications of weapons systems under
development as the LRO was intended to do. The MRO lost
the conceptual approach of the LRO and became an estimate
of the number and type forces which could procure and operate
within defined fiscal limits. The MRO lowered the time
horizon from fifteen in LRO to eleven years. Beginning in
the mid- 1960 's the broader concerns of strategy and policy,
formerly a task of OP-93 became the responsibility of the
Navy Strategic Study (NSS) prepared by the DCNO (Plans and
Policy) (OP- 06). This new arrangement proved to be better
suited to the integration of the shorter range MRO planning
programs than the longer range system of the 1950' s, but the
improvement may have been superficial. Forced to function
in the departmental structure, far removed from the seat of
decision-making, long-term policy formulation took a noticeable
fall from prominence after the Vietnam War began.
B. CONCEPTUAL AND FUNCTIONAL PLANNING
A new division within the scope of planning surfaced in
the mid-1960' s. A differentiation between conceptual and
functional planning became evident throughout the Department
of Defense, exemplified in the Navy by the LRO and MRO
statements
.
"Conceptual plans may be defined as broadly conceived
studies, concerned with identifying long-term, goals
by examining unstructured and irregular data from
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both inside and outside the Navy, and combining
geo-political, technological and economic factors.
Functional planning, on the other hand, is much
more narrow and structured. Concerned with pro-
gramming objectives, it has been identified
primarily with the PPBS system, and is based
largely on internally generated data and conducted
in accordance with regular procedures and
timetables. ^^
Fewer study groups surfaced within the Navy department with
instructions to provide longer range conceptual guidance
than study groups designed to generate and analyze empirical
data.
In August 1969, OP-93 submitted its last objectives
statement. Its value to the Navy can only be assumed but it
served as the basis for the Navy's response to National
Security Study Memorandum CNSSM)50 on the status and future
89
of U. S. naval forces.
After the disestablishment of OP-93 in September 1970,
its director Rear Admiral Roy G. Anderson became the
director of OP-96 the Systems Analysis Division. The sub-
division OP-96L staffed by three Navy Captains, one Marine
Colonel and one civilian GS-17, assumed the long-range planning
duties previously assigned to OP-93. Further reductions in
S'S
Ibid., Historical Perspectives of Long Range Planning
in the Navy, p. 58.
^^United States Long Range Objectives, LRO-81, Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations, August 1969, copy received
from OP-965, Extended Planning branch. Systems Analysis
Division. Cited in Historical Perspectives in Long-Range
Planning in the Navy, p. STT
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the emphasis long-range planning came in August 1971, when
Rear Admiral Stansfield Turner, director of OP-96 recommended
that the production of annual Long Range Objective statements
be discontinued. He contended that the LRO had been reduced
to little more than a formality and that the information
which was to be conveyed to the CNO was available to him from
many other sources. OP-96L was redesignated as OP-965 and
assumed the role believed by Admiral Turner to have been the
original function of the Long Range Objectives Group. That
original function was to "select and analyze specific problems
affecting the Navy and developing objectives for solving
those problems in the future." By 1978 the size and in-
fluence of OP-965 was reflected by its staff, four officers,
the highest rank being a Commander. Neither LRO nor MRO
statements were continued and OP-965 became responsible for
production of the Extended Planning Annex (EPA) to the Navy
Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) and the CNO Planning and
90Programming Guidance (CPPG)
.
Consistent long-range naval planning was not a major
focus during the 1960 's and 1970' s. External pressure from
the Secretary of Defense for system analysis approaches to
efficiency reduced planning to estimates of near term force
90 Stansfield Turner to Director, Navy Program Planning,
Serial 805P96, 13 August 1971, Subject: Future Status of
the Long Range Planning Document, OP-965 files. Cited in




Consistent long-range naval planning was not a major focus
during the 1960's and 1970' s. External pressure from the
Secretary of Defense for system analysis approaches to
efficiency reduced planning to estimates of near term force
levels, requirements, and associated operations and procurement
fiscal demands. Very little meaningful long-range planning
has occurred during a crisis or wartime situation; Vietnam
was no exception. Short-term exigencies act as blinders to
further ranging plan development. Additionally, the re-
duction on overall military influence to decision-making and
the loss of access by long-range planners to executive councils
greatly diluted any conceptual strategic innovations. Several
short-term - five to ten years - studies were conducted
within the Navy Department, Major Fleet Escort Study '67,
Sea Mix I, II and III and the Navy Mission Effectiveness




Although largely conducted outside the normal Navy
planning system, Project 60 initiated by CNO Admiral Zumwalt,
1970-1974 could be categorized as a form of conceptual planning
It was designed to provide the CNO and the Navy a comprehensive
plan for guidance during the CNO's tenure for shipbuilding,
manpower and modernization developments. A logical follow-on
study report was compiled toward the end of Admiral Zumwalt 's
tour called. Project 2000. The three volume report was
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unique in several respects. It combined Navy and contractor
date into a plan designed to layout a naval plan for what
kind of Navy would be necessary in the year 2000 rather than
the size of force levels and specific types of weapons. First
building a perception of the political, economic, inter-
national, resource and military milieu that would likely
exist in the year 2000 and planning backward to the 1970' s,
it was hoped that efforts would be initiated to provide for
the future requirements. Project 2000 was cancelled in 1977
91
without update or replacement.
Admiral Zumwalt, perhaps unknowingly, ushered in a
trend of CNO's channeling their long-range strategic concerns
to ad hoc, personally supervised study groups. His feeling
of the reduction in prestige and influence of the Office of
the Chief Naval Operations as a result of greater civilianized
centralization, substantially impeded the Navy's development
of its own long-range strategic plans. Admiral Zumwalt
reflected his doubts that the power remaining in the Office
of the CNO was sufficient to sustain an institutionalized
formal long-range planning system of any real value in
opening comments to a draft of the Project 2000 report:
"There has been a steady diminution of the power of
Chiefs of Naval Operations over the years. As the
Pentagon has become increasingly centralized, a by
product of this centralization has been a steady
gT
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch
,
(New York: The New
York Times Book Co., 1976) p. 66-84.
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deterioration in any real payoff for long-range
planning in the Navy in a bureaucratic sense. This
erosion has also driven the long-range planning
process to be useful only to the CNO in his personal"
capacity in dealing with a centralized Pentagon and
in meetings with the JCS , the Secretary of the Navy,
the Secretary of Defense, the President and
Congressional Committees. ^^
By mid- 1979, a new trend for Navy Planning had emerged, a
further splintering of the system responsible for long-range
conceptual planning. The work of OP-965 continues to support
the Extended Planning Annex, and the CNO Planning and
Programming Guidance, even though manning remains at a very
low level. The Strategic Plans Division still submits the
Navy Strategic Study but only occasionally, much as the
Joint Long Range Strategic Estimate to which it is linked.
The new approach to planning results from warfare specialty
or platform sponsor divisions within OPNAV; primarily from
the DCNO (Submarine Warfare) COP-02), the DCNO (Surface
Warfare) (OP-03), and the DCNO (Air Warfare) (OP-05).
Following the lead of OP-03 in 1973 each DCNO now promulgates
a Warfare Master Plan.
These plans are updated annually, and provide input to
the POM, the CPPG and the EPA. This further fragmentation
and interest-oriented approach to planning cannot heighten
Navy sights for longer range planning.
Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., Admiral USN (Ret), letter to
David A. Rosenberg, 23 November 1979. Cited in Ibid.,




2. Evaluations of Navy Study Groups
A few observations had conclusions from the 1973
Beamont Study, the Maritime Balance Study and the exhaustive
survey the "Historical Perspectives in Long-Range Planning
in the Navy", can serve as a summary of the Navy's current
planning status and offer recommendations for structuring an
93improvement to the system. The Beamont Study relates three
specific areas of concern for the future of Navy planning:
"a broader and longer range view of the world is greatly
needed. First, the Navy must consider social, economic
and political developments that will affect it as a
military institution. Second, military doctrine must
be considered against the background of changing tech-
nological and strategic developments and assessments
of the future. Third, these changes must be considered
in terms of the lead time needed for both hardware and
manpower planning. "^^
Even though no proposal was forthcoming, a recommendation was ex-
pressed for a segregation of present-day short term operational
decisions from planning. Also suggested was an emphasis on
planning as being a vital process in the Navy not a secondary
or collateral concern. Most recommendations of the Beamont
Study were viewed as impossible to implement given existing
departmental constraints.
nr
The Beamont Study is a contractor's study of "major
Organizational considerations for the Chief of Naval Operations,"
The document is not accessable through normal governmental
distribution channels.
94 Organizational Resources Counselors, Inc., Major
Organizational Considerations for the Chief of Naval
Operations
,






The observations relayed in the "Historical Perspectives
of Long Range Planning in the Navy" suggest that long-range
planning of any great value in the Navy just might be a near
impossibility, given current organizational framework. The
report's prime researcher Dr. David A. Rosenberg offers the
following indicators: there was no truly systemic process
for doing long-range planning in the U.S. Navy since 1945
for the following reasons:
1. The most obvious is that long-range planning is
an extremely difficult undertaking, filled with
myriad uncertainties that defy accurate prediction
and thus hinder any true integrated future planning.
2. Contentment with force levels through the early
1960s, complicated by urgent requirements of
accelerated Polaris development and Vietnam
prevented any long-term strategy.
3. Due to the Navy's internal structure, a systematic
long-range planning process could not be developed.
The Navy is a complex amalgram of different
internal interest groups dating back to the
controversy between line and engineering officers
in 1860. The ascendancy of aviation and submarine
specialization hampers the "One Navy" concept.
Weighing and redressing the needs of distinctly
different warfare fields is difficult.
4. The unpredictability of overall defense budgets
and particularly the Navy's apportionment make
realistic long-range projections impossible.
Dr. Rosenberg raises an intriguing question:
Did organizational changes within the Department
of Defense inhibit long-range planning in the
Navy? The obvious answer, especially as it
relates to the early stages after reorganization,
is yes reorganization did inhibit Navy planning.
The most important aspect of the question is
whether or not the Navy could better have adapted
to the organization. A single answer is




5. A final observation calls for an assessment of
the impact on long-range planning that resulted
from the role of individual policy makers.
Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Admirals'
Burke, Zumwalt and Rickover are offered for
consideration. ^^
Some conclusions and recommendations from the committee
report on the "Maritime Balance Study, The Navy Strategic
Planning Experiment" can be joined with lessons relegated
above to form a proposal for improvements in the Navy planning
system.
1. As of early 1979, there was no centralized
organization within either the Office of the
Chief of Naval Operations or the Office of the
Secretary of the Navy capable of performing and
integrating conceptual and functional long-
range planning and that historical evidence
indicates that there is a need for the rees-
tablishment of such an organization.
2. In order for a planning organization to succeed,
there must be a personal commitment on the part
of the Chief of Naval Operations and/or the
Secretary of the Navy to such integrated long-
range planning.
3. Despite the need for commitment by the highest
policy makers planning groups should not be so
tightly controlled as to be identified
exclusively with a single policy maker whose
departure will terminate their usefulness and
influence. A good illustration of this problem
is found in Admiral Zumwalt 's sponsorship of
Project 2000, which was not followed up on by
his successor and therefore has had virtually
no impact. If the project had been the
responsibility of an established planning office
rather than a personally selected ad hoc group,






it is possible that its chances for survival as
an ongoing endeavor within the Office of the CNO
would have been improved.
4. The long-range planning group should be organ-
izationally located "close to the throne," with
direct access to high policy makers.
5. While the long-range planning group should be
primarily concerned with the broad future of the
Navy, it cannot and should not be isolated from
current problems. It should have access to, and
the opportunity to comment on, short range and
operational plans. One of the most useful
functions performed by OP- 93 in the 1950s was its
review of current policy developments to assess
their possible impact on the Navy's ability to
achieve its long-term objectives.
6. A long-range planning group must be considered
important enough by high policy makers so that
its studies will have an impact on Navy policy
and operations. Among other things this means
that policy makers must be sensitive to the
uncertainties involved in any attempt to predict
the future; efforts to quantify the accuracy of
the planning groups studies are likely to under-
mine both its morale and its effectiveness. In
addition, in order to ensure that the long-range
planning group's work will be good enough to
prove its worth to policy makers, the office must
be staffed by personnel of broad experience and
high caliber, and work well done must be recognized
and rewarded.
Three gems of wisdom are also expressed by the study
panel which will be applied to and expounded upon in the dis-
cussion later of a corps of Naval strategists.
1. Any planning system which is instituted must be
carefully adapted to current circumstances and
constraints
.
2. Neither a General Board nor a Long Range Objectives
Group as originally constituted could work effectively




3. Given the multiple problems facing the U.S. Navy
today, it is certain that no single organizational
change can provide the necessary solutions. ^6
Conclusion
In mid- January 1980, Admiral Thomas B. Hayward, Chief of
Naval Operations, renewed past concerns for a long term view
of the Navy's requirements and strategies. He instituted a
series of wide ranging organizational changes in the Office
of the CNO which will serve as a foundation and point of
departure for the next chapter.
In proposing a system for long-range planning that can
be useful to the Navy, be adapted to current imperatives and
provide long term guidance it is necessary that there be an
understanding of the experiences of others faced with a
unique environment for planning. The Navy's future poses
such a unique environment for assessment of its objectives.
The above description of past Navy attempts to create a
continuous and consistent planning process is a necessary
foundation for analyzing why past planning techniques failed
and how they may be adapted to today's milieu.
"^
Ibid., Maritime Balance Study p. A-19-20
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IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CORPS OF NAVAL
STRATEGISTS
"Neither our political nor our military system makes it
suitable that we should have a general staff organized
like the German general staff or like the French general
staff; but the common experience of mankind is that the
things which those general staffs do, have to be done
in every well-managed and well-directed army, and they
have to be done by a body of men especially assigned
to do them. We should have such a body of men
selected and organized in our own way and in accordance
with our own system to do these essential things. The
most intelligible way to describe such a body of men,
however selected and organized is by calling it a
general staff, because its duties are staff duties
and are general in their character." Extract from
the Report of the Secretary of War Elihu Root in
1902.97
This proposal for a corps of Naval strategists is designed
as an aid to meet the strategic planning needs of the present-
day U.S. Navy. An admittedly modest change is invisioned as
a beginning in improving the planning process of the Navy.
If deemed beneficial, it may lead to other modifications to
the system which could vastly improve the Navy's ability to
meet its growing responsibilities. The proposal will be
presented in three sections. The first is a justification
for a single command member as the planner rather than a
consolidated group tasked with strategic planning responsi-
bilities for the entire Navy. Secondly, a description the
^Walter Millis, American Military Thought, p. 256.
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unique education and training procedure for strategic planners
will be offered. Lastly, a delineation of the specific
responsibilities and collateral functions of the Naval
strategist will serve to explain the usefulness of the
proposed change to the Navy planning system. Implementation
of this plan will usher in a method for;
1. improving the effectiveness of Navy planning by
enhancing the efficiency, continuity, consistency
and day-to-day planning in the Navy to the point
of allowing increased time for longer lead time
and broader scope planning
2. create a function within every command staff that
is concerned almost exclusively with long-term
proximate results of command decisions and actions
A. THE NATURE OF THE CHANGE
A widely held assumption is that no single change to the
Navy's planning system will be able to correct the weakness
in the present process. Sweeping changes are frankly not
possible in our representative society without major upheaval.
Within the present norm, our plans for the future are steeped
in the impressions of the past. American cultural and poli-
tical characteristics indicate incontrovertibly that a rise to
dominant militarism embodied in a general staff patterned
after that of Germany is not a possibility unless the society
is radically altered, perhaps to the extreme of going mad.
Two characteristics of American society seem to preclude
the development of and adherence to a long-range strategy,
98they are impatience and a lack of continuity.
g^American cultural impatience is a focus of the following
works; Stanley Hoffman, "Restraints and Choices in American
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"The crusading spirit is marked by impatience and
irritation with time-consuming complexity. Americans
believe that, with a little common sense and know-ho.w,
things can be done in a hurry. Neither protracted,
limited war nor costly, sustained programs for
military preparedness fit this temper of the American
mind. "^^
The decision-making framework in the United States is based
on a cyclic influx of new ideas and perspectives. At the
apex of the decision-making pyramid are popularly elected
officials who are subject to confidence votes every two for
Congress, four years for the executive branch and six year
intervals for the Senate. This unfortunately is partly
responsible for and perpetuates both the societal impatience
and discontinuity. Government officials cannot support
initiatives whose long term effects on the future are more
favorable to America than a short-term, more politically
feasible alternative when the official's continuance in his
position is laid to arbitration on regular short-term bases.
Viable long-range plans generally depend upon current
Foreign Policy," Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 39, Gabriel
Almond, "Public Opinion, Opinion-Makers, and Foreign Policy,"
Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 57, and A. Russell Buchanan,
".'\merican Attitude Toward War," Ibid., Deconde, p. 16.
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Amos A. Jordan, and William J. Taylor, Jr., American
National Security
,
(Baltimore: The Johns and Hopkins
University Press, 1981) p. 54.
Stanley Hoffman, "Restraints and Choices in American
Foreign Policy," Ibid., Furniss and Snyder, p. 37.
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sacrifices for success. Sir Robert Thompson, an observer of
America's difficulties in Vietnam offered a fairly common
cultural appraisal,
"weaknesses in the American character were to play
their part. Of these, the most important is
impatience. . .more than any other factor, coupled
with the frustration which automatically follows,
it has led to a desire for quick results. "^^^
Discontinuity within the military planning structure is
a product of career-demand personnel changes, identity of
long range studies with particular policy makers who remain
in any position no more than four years, a lack of insti-
tutionalized consensus on the proper course of action,
among other reasons.
1. An Alternative to the Group Approach
"The springs of policy bubble up; they do not trickle
down. Dean Acheson^^^
Considering the present structure of the U.S. Navy -
interest peddling program sponsors, the cycle of changing the
CNO at least every four years, the annual budget cycle, the
three major warfare specialties among other considerations -
evidence points to establishing an alternative to the present
long-range planning system where the function is not instilled
in a selective, consolidated group. Committees with a
^^^Robert Thompson, No Exit From Vietnam , (New York: David
McCay Co., Inc., 1969) p. 125.
'^^Dean Acheson, "Thoughts About Thought in High Places,"
ed. Andrew M. Scott and Raymond H. Dawson, Readings in the
Making of American Foreign Policy , (New YorFl The MacMiiian




reasonable degree o£ influence on the course of Navy planning
must have access to, yet not become identified with top. policy
makers, they must carry executive authority, and represent
but be independent of operational, logistical and technological
division imperatives, be able to operate under given long-
range fiscal projections but remain flexible enough to accom-
modate short term budget constraints. The establishment of
so adroit a committee is not impossible, but in any period
short of declared war the creation of such a group is well
beyond the probable.
In mid- January 1980, the CNO Admiral Thomas Hayward
instituted fundamental, useful changes in the OPNAV structure.
Partly because of his concern for the Navy's future and
partly to counter the view of certain "key decision makers
outside the Navy" that the service was suffering from dis-
organization, inefficiency, and disunity, he commissioned
several study groups to assess the Navy's ability to plan and
meet the needs of its future. One study proved to be too
controversial to publish but as far as is known its
recommendations were very similar to recommendations of other
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study groups. Admiral Hayward' s solution was to partially
TTTT
This study, personnally commissioned by Admiral Hayward
was conducted by Dr. Victor Basiuk. Dr. Basiuk is a Naval
Reserve captain, political scientist, expert on national
science policy, and former associate of the Institute of War
and Peace Studies at Columbia University. The focus of his
recommendations is very much in line with the recommendations
of The Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Planning
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resurrect the old OP-97, the Office of Strategic Offensive
and Defensive Systems (1967-1972), but added tactical nuclear
plans and policy and nuclear arms control negotiations to its
list of responsibilities. He created a Directorate of Naval
Warfare (OP- 95) to provide better liaison between OPNAV and
the fleet, and to integrate programs across the individual
warfare specialty lines of communications. And lastly, he
established a dedicated long-range planning function in the
immediate office of the CNO, the first such division in
nearly a decade.
2 . Toward a Process Not a Product
By his efforts in 1980, Admiral Hayward responded to
recommendations of the various study panels when he created
a Long Range Planning Group (OP-OOX). Located within the
immediate office of the CNO, Admiral Hayward assigned OP-OOX
as a permanent fixture in the OPNAV structure administratively
equal to OP-OOK, the Executive Panel composed of outside
experts. Functionally, OP-OOX was to operate as OP-93 had
several years earlier. Group members reported directly to
the CNO and were drawn from officers possessing broad
experience and expertise in warfare and planning specialties.
and the Maritime Balance Study: An Experiment, discussed
earlier. A major point stressed in the former findings was
that the input of the increasingly powerful platform sponsor
offices should be balanced by planners who viewed Navy pro-
grams as a whole. Telephone interview with Dr. Basiuk and
Dr. Rosenberg in November 1979. Cited in Ibid., Historical





The first director o£ OP-OOX, early Admiral selectee
Charles R. Larson was a uniquely qualified Naval officer. A
1958 Naval Academy graduate, Admiral Larson was first a
Naval aviator who transferred to nuclear submarine duty,
ultimately commanding the USS Halibut (SSN-587). He served
as a White House Fellow under President Johnson and later
served as Naval Aide to President Nixon. At the time of his
appointment as head of OP-OOX, Admiral Larson was director
of OP-21, the Strategic Submarine Division, with responsibility
for providing OPNAV guidance on the Polaris, Poseidon and
Trident submarine programs.
Admiral Larson assembled a small staff of broadly
talented officers, but all met the essential requirement,
that they possess the understanding for conducting solid
strategic planning. Members of the group were chosen and
assigned according to their expertise to fill the role of a
Technology Planner, a Politico-Military Planner, a Resources
104
Planner, a Program Planner and an intelligence analyst.
As originally staffed, OP-OOX' s deputy director was a
surface warfare officer with an MS in management and
experience as a destroyer squadron commander and as commander
of the NATO Standing Naval Force, Atlantic; the Technology
Planner was surface warfare officer with a submarine back-
ground and Ph.D. in engineering (physical oceanography) from
M.I.T.; the Resources Planner was surface officer with a
doctorate in business administration from the Harvard Business
School; the Politico-Military Planner was a jet attack pilot
with an M.A. in international relations from Oxford; and the
Program Planner was an experienced F-14 Naval Flight Officer
with a background in budgeting and programming. Memorandum,
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The achievements of so obviously qualified, specialized,
and supported a group as OP-OOX will not be realized for
quite some time. As the result of a recognized need for
long-range planning in the Navy and the personal concerns of
the top Navy policy maker, OP-OOX ushered in a new trend for
Navy planning groups. In contrast to OP-93's plans or
objectives statements which were considered the most important
part of long-range planning, OP-OOX focused on the planning
process where top policy makers established their organization's
objectives and decided upon strategies to meet those goals.
The product was subordinate to the process
.
"many (by no means all) U.S. General Staff members
are carefully selected, but few are "hand-picked"
in the manner of the Prussian model, where the
pool of top-quality applicants annually outnumbered
appointees by forty-fifty to one. There is no
probation period. Recurring assignments are the
exception, rather than the rule. The experience
base therefore builds slowly and demands constant
refurbishment. Institutional memories are rarely
long. New officers relearn old lessons, at increased
costs measured in time, money, wasted motion, lost
leverage and sometimes, in lost lives. "1^^
Unfortunately, a Naval tradition has continued as Admiral
Watkins, the new CNO as of June 1982, disbanded OP-OOX and
Rear Admiral Charles R. Larson, to the Executive Assistant
to the Chief of the Naval Operations, Subject: Officer
Manning for the Long Range Planning Group (OP-OOX), Serial
21/302884, December 4, 1979. Cited in Ibid., Historical
Perspectives in Long-Range Planning in the Navy, p. 82-83.
'^^John M. Collins, U.S. Defense Planning A Critique
,
(Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1982J p. TTI
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shifted its function to OP-OOK, the Executive Panel. The
impact of this move remains to be seen.
This proposal for an arrangement in naval planning
that can serve as a stop gap approach to improve efficiency
in the day-to-day operations of the Navy should result in
some progress in developing a longer range view of the Navy
future until a system is instituted which addresses more of
the Navy's needs. Continuity and consistency in Navy planning
is urgently needed today because of increasing responsibilities
in an increasingly threatening environment and ever more
constraining resource limitations. Disbursal of specially
trained, knowledgeable strategic planners throughout the
command and staff structure of the Navy will bridge the gap
between the operations and decision-makers, those who plan
and those who carry out orders, those concerned with today
and those concentrating on tomorrow.
3. Education and Training: the Key
"Always be more than you seem." General von Molke
Naval officers selected to serve as Naval strategists
will, by necessity, be very special individuals, loyalty
should overshadow ambition, reason should shade genius,
resourcefulness be valued over end-product orientation and
curiosity blank complacency.
^•^^Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State
,
(Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1957} pT 51
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"to be a capable long-range planner, one must, in my
view, be uncomfortable with the status quo, must be
continuously reexamining, questioning, probing-
-
searching for weakness and ways to make improvements'
in the present way of doing things. "10^
He must gain broad experience in a very short time, and
develop wisdom that hides his years. The Naval strategist
career will demand communication skills, and aplomb so that
precious little time or knowledge is lost in translation
between decision m.aker, planner and operational commander.
The Naval strategist will operate in a presently
existing Navy Department or fleet staff, but more importantly
will be a link in a Navy-wide network of Naval strategists.
Sole loyalty for the strategist will be to the commander or
director of the staff to which he is assigned but constant
communication between strategists will be maintained to offer
support, advice and insight to individual strategists. Ideally,
the position of Vice Chief of Naval Operations would be held
by a career Naval strategist who should be able to coordinate
all long-range Naval planning through the network reaching
through the various command and staff strata of the Navy.
Viewed from a perspective of authority, power and
108influence, the position occupied by the Naval strategist
Letter from Admiral George Miller to David A. Rosenberg,
23 July 1979. Cited in Ibid., Historical Perspectives in




For a description of the authority, power, influence
relationship consult, Richard M. Emerson, "Power- Dependence
Relations," American Sociological Review , Vol. 27, No. 1,
February, 1962, p. 31-41.
108

will carry no authority. The source of his usefulness to the
Navy be as the repository for the command corporate knowledge,
his experienced and educated broad perspective on maritime
and national matters and his concentration of energies on
overall, long-range strategies. The Naval strategist will
not possess or convey any command authority but will be
valuable to the command policy formulation and decision maker
by increasing the effectiveness of the commander's staff
organization. This enhanced effectiveness will produce more
credible, thoroughly researched military plans and advice,
more consistent and innovative policy inputs thereby increasing
the power of the commander. This power is translated into
greater influence being exerted by the command level authority
in dealings with higher level command within the Navy, with
the Secretary of Defense and other departments within the
military establishment.
Specialized education is an essential element in the
preparation process of a Naval strategist.
"Probably the most revolutionary aspect of the Prussian
system was its assumption that genius was superfluous,
and even dangerous and that reliance must be placed
upon average men succeeding by superior education,
organization and experience. This approach, on the
one hand, subordinated the individual to the col-
lective will and intelligence of the whole, and yet
guaranteed to the individual wide freedom of action
so long as he remained upon his proper level and
within his sphere of responsibility. It was the
antithesis of the eighteenth century theory of the
military genius. English observers of the Prussian
system were impressed by the absence of the slavish
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and mechanical obedience to superiors characteristic
o£ other armies and the particular function without
intervening in the duties of others. "109
Though a uniquely trained Naval officer, it is
important that the Naval strategist be assigned as an
Unrestricted Line Officer. Selection of strategists should
be on a volunteer basis since the officer may face limited
command and promotion opportunities. Acceptance into training
as a Naval strategist can take place at the commissioning
source, the Naval Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps,
Officer Candidate School at Newport or Aviation Officers
Candidate School and the point in one's career at which primary
warfare qualification is earned i.e., SWO for surface, wings
for Aviation officers and dolphins for submarine officers.
Training for a Naval strategist, other than under-
graduate degree requirements, does not deviate from the
normal career path for junior officers until at the point of
warfare designation. Prospective strategists should be
assigned to Norfolk Naval Station or within the San Diego
Naval complex. Both areas of assignment have contingents
representing the major warfare specialties, aviation, surface
and submarine forces. Initial sea tours for Naval strategists
will include designation as a primary warfare specialist,
within the first two to two and one half years followed by
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A typical training flow for a Naval strategist assigned
to the Norfolk area, might begin with aircrew training as a
Naval Flight Officer in the E-2 Hawkeye aircraft following
designation through the AOCS pipeline. As the eyes of the
carrier task group, the E-2 radar surveillance aircraft
provides its operators with a unique view of combined naval
forces' threats, capabilities and difficulties. It is the
prime communications link while deployed, for surface, sub-
marine and airborne combatants. Knowledge, gained by
experience with this vital link between the task force
commander, his ready forces and higher echelon authority is
crucial to the planning effort. No better vantage point
exists in the fleet to gaining this experience than the
airborne command post E-2 aircraft.
After completing one squadron sea tour and at least
one major deployment, the strategist would then move to a
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surface or subsurface unit for experience in both other
specialties. It is strongly recommended that for surface
training, duty aboard a unit of a Cruiser Destroyer Group be
assigned. Cruiser duty offers an opportunity for experience
in operations which combine surface, subsurface and aviation
units. An understanding of anti-submarine operations is
essential for strategic planners and there is no better
exposure to the environment than aboard a cruiser. Decisions
upon which ship or squadron designation is based would include
deployment schedules, billet availability, sequencing of
strategists' assignments for maximum experience and exposure
to the latest fleet capabilities and platforms. Prior to the
completion of warfare training in the three primary specialties
the strategic planner should have completed the correspondence
courses offered through the Naval War College. Single
siting a prospective strategist for the first five years of
training and for most of his career will reduce permanent
change of station order fund requirements, improve the
continuity of staff planning by lengthened tours and offer
On a basis of 5-7 hours per week the series of courses
should require no more than three years of study. The
graduate level series of courses includes the subject areas
of Employment of Naval Forces, Strategy and Policy, Defense
Economics and Decision Making, with electives offered in
International Law and International Relations. A nonresident
diploma is issued by the Naval War College for anyone suc-
cessfully completing the course of study. Additionally,
graduate level credit and Reserve officer retirement points
are credited upon completion.
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small material incentives to the strategist to compensate
for other lost opportunities in the Naval Service.
Recognition as an Unrestricted Line Officer and
designation as a primary Warfare Specialist will enhance the
two-way communications between planner and operator and
guard against the isolation of the planner from the real
world of fleet operations. Additionally, it will help main-
tain for the Navy a degree of operational value in the
strategic planner, should the urgency of wartime dictate
that his skills in the fleet override his planning function.
Essentially, for the few qualified naval strategists, their
specialties are the reverse of their contemporaries. The
0026 General Strategic Planning subspecialty becomes the
primary skill for a planner and his fleet operational desig-
nations are relegated to secondary specialties for him.
In all likelihood the prospective strategist will
not reach major division officer or department head level
in any of the commands to which he is attached for training
in the first five years. Aspirations to command should not
be a compelling drive for strategists. From the Prussian
example we recognize the improbability that the battlefield
leader is also the chief planner for operations. Not since
the relatively simple days of Frederick the Great and
Napoleon has a single military genius sufficed for both field
commander and chief of staff. Complexities of modern war and
peace make specialization an imperative.
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Every effort should be made to assign the prospective
strategist to billets within each command that will allow
the maximum exposure to operational demands as possible.
Only in rare situations should the trainee be assigned to a
position required for the career progression of regular URL
officers. For instance, the prospective strategist should
not expect a department head billet and perhaps not even a
major division officer job. Where possible, the planner
under training should not count against a commanding officer's
manpower allocation. He should be placed in departments and
divisions where he will receive the most comprehensive survey
of the necessary skills for fleet operators, the environmental
demands, fiscal and manpower constraints and the valuable
communications idiosyncrasies of each warfare specialty which
can only be gained first hand.
Following the five year assignment in the various
warfare specialties the prospective Naval strategist should
have a thorough understanding of fleet operations. It is doubtful
that any officer could or has gained as broad a working know-
ledge of so complex a military arm if the officer had been
confined to a single warfare specialty.
Formal educational experience becomes a must for
Naval strategist to progress to the career applications stage.
The sequence of training is important so too is the orientation
of the institution chosen for study. An academic segment
not founded on and focused by operational experience would be
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far less productive than the reverse. More effective use
of the strategic planning theories and skills will be
realized if applied to the operational framework gained by-
experience and understood in terms of the context within
which the planner will be expected to perform.
The Naval Postgraduate School at Monterey, California,
single sites the best training in three very important fields
of study for the Naval planner. The 686 Strategic Planning-
General curriculum provides the detailed fundamentals of
strategic planning, the necessary global relations knowledge
as well as economics, computer applications, intelligence/
threat assessments and methods for long-range Navy planning.
Four weeks should be allotted to a quota for each strategic
planner to attend the Defense Resources Management Education
Center located at the Naval Postgraduate School. The course
offers the systems analysis-oriented approach to applied
decision-making. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories,
just a short distance from NPS provides an outstanding
opportunity to learn about nuclear weapons design, development
and applications.
Having coupled formal educational experience with
operational on-the-job training, the Naval planner is ready
for assignment to a strategic planning billet. Naval
m
A Cohort Tracking Analysis done by the Subspecialty
Procurement Control Branch of Naval Military Personnel Command
(W4PC) dated 8 April, 1980 for Total Force Planning Division
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policy originates in the Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, OPNAV. It is important that as early as possible
the linkage be made between the fleet and the seat of policy
formulation. Upon assignment to OP- 06 Plans, Policy and
Operations Division the Naval planner should have a quota
reserved to attend the scenario build-up, the war and
debrief for war games at the Naval War College.
Subsequent assignments to a tour at OPNAV should
be determined by service needs and a matching of planner
specialization to command/staff needs. As suggested in Fig.
1, planners will still rotate between sea and shore duty,
but never should any assignment last for less than five years
B. DUTIES OF THE NAVAL STRATEGISTS
"common sense is not an abundant commodity, and the
practice of thinking problems through is exceedingly
rare, especially among persons whose conclusions are
untrammeled by responsibility. The layman unacquainted
with the prevailing ideas of strategy will, when
confronted with a strategic problem, frequently
venture unwise proposals. Yet intelligence and an
inclination to think are indispensible even when
one is conversant with the principles - among
professionals as well as laymen. Adherence to one
principle frequently demands violation of another,
and there is no principle but admits of exceptions.
Wars cannot be fought according to books of rules.
I
(OP- 11) showed that of the Naval Officers receiving funded
graduate educational from 1971-1979, 29.3% had not been
assigned a tour of validated utilization billet. Overall
subspecialty utilization peak was less than 80%. This
resulted in a loss of over $8,000,000 for the period between
1971 and 1975. Naval Audit Service , Western Region, Audit




The admiral or general who adheres inflexibly to any-
set o£ preconceived commandments is hardly likely to
be a victor against a resourceful opponent . "112
The duties assigned to the Naval strategists must vary by
the number of billets, the wide variety of commands and
staffs to which they may be assigned and the changing nature
of day-to-day Navy operations. The specific duties will
remain an ill-defined set of responsibilities. The planning
process is crucial to any military undertaking. The planning
function is much too important a function to be left to
officers who can only devote part-time attention to planning.
The requirements of the command career path demand that an
officer concentrate on developing the skills and knowledge
necessary to command naval units and combatants in wartime.
Even if there are star-quality individuals who can meet the
demands of the command ladder and the planning role, since
his time must be divided between the two functions, continuity
of the planning process will suffer.
The Naval strategic planner will offer a long-range
perspective on all plans and policy inputs that is gained not by
innate brilliance but by longevity in command assignments,
broad-based educational and operational expertise and full-
time, focussed attention to planning. The strategic planner
could possibly be the only command/staff officer "trammeled
by responsibility." As a result of assignment duration, the
b
TT7
Bernard Brodie, A Guide to Naval Strategy, (Princeton
Princeton University Press, 1944) p. 11.
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planner may be the individual involved with a plan from the
drawing board to operational execution or through the approval
stage for contingency plans.
Efforts should be made, though to maintain a separation
between the long-range planner and those who implement
the accepted plans. When execution of a plan begins planning
for following events ceases. The German General Staff sought
to couple planning and operations to minimize translation
disconnects. Results of German campaigns show that planning
and preparation for war, especially for short limited wars or
for wars that did not come, was truly outstanding. However,
the planning of the German staff system was less effective
during protracted campaigns where initial plans were thwarted,
they were also less effective when technology and complexity
increased as witnessed during World War I.
Under the proposed Navy system the operational
command/staff plans would still generate all staff plans but
would allow review and recommendation by the strategic
planner before submittal. The long-range planner would
measure proposed plans against proximate long term results
of actions.
The conventional wisdom claims that only operationally-
oriented officers - those from the trenches - are the only
officers who can plan realistically. Decidedly, the planner
must understand the dilemmas faced by operational commitments
and he must recognize and appreciate the special needs of
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those engaged in war or peacetime exercises. Without a
"trench of the future" in which to gain experience, the
planner is forced into a mode for which the military has been
criticized, that of planning for future wars in terms of
lessons from the last war.
1. Fusionism
There are valid concerns expressed from inside and
outside the military, that any movement by officers away from
the "naval line" can develop momentum and swing so far as to
create an elite class within the military. One such concern
involves the purist or fusionist view of military advice.
The debate, though originally centered on the credibility
of military advice, carries over into all forms of civilian-
military interaction. The purist view expressed most
staunchly by most but not all World War II senior officers
calls for strict adherence to the separation of military
leaders from matters of policy other than military. General
Matthew Ridgeway, army chief of staff in 1955 summarized the
purist view of military advice when he offered,
"The military advisor should give his competent pro-
fessional advice based on the military aspects of
the programs referred to him, based on his fearless,
honest, objective estimate of the national interest,
and regardless of adminstration policy at any
particular time. He should confine his advice to
the essential military aspects. "H^
TTZ
Matthew Ridgeway' s "Farewell Letter" to Secretary of
Defense Charles R. Wilson, June 27, 1955.
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General Douglas MacArthur further extended the purist point
of view beyond military advice,
"Your mission remains fixed, determined, inviolable -
it is to win our wars. Everything else in your
professional career is but corollary to this vital
dedication. "114
The fusionist proponents contend that the foreign
policy enviornment evident after World War II meant "there
was no such thing as purely military considerations . "^^
Surprisingly, another senior military leader General
Maxwell Taylor voiced the counter argument, fusionism.
"Nothing is so likely to repel the civilian decision-
makers as a military argument which omits obvious
considerations which the President cannot omit.
If the Chiefs (of Staff) are concerned only about
the record, it may be very well to try to abstract
the military elements of a problem and to deal with
them alone; but if they want to persuade a President,
they had better look at the totality of his problem
and try to give maximum help."ll^
Civilian leaders universally tend to favor the
fusionists broader ranged advice over the strict military
input to policy formulation. Difficult political decisions
can be made less so if military advisors offer up militarily
weakened but more politically feasible solutions. Knowledgeable
TU Douglas MacArthur, Address delivered at West Point,
May 12, 1962.
Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor, Jr., American
National Security Policy and Process
,
(Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press lysij p. TES
.




civilians are as equally divided over the issue as military
leaders. Robert Lovett, former secretary of war and under-
secretary of state, believed that,
"The ability of the military expert to give wise advice
and to get it listened to by policy-making officials
depends in great measure on his possessing knowledge
in key non-military fields and in seeing issues in
broad perspective. A military career officer must be
highly skilled in his own profession, but he cannot
-^-.j
afford to become trapped in narrow professionalism."
The noted military historian Samuel P. Huntington,
became an early critic of fusionism when he warned that if
the military
"broadened its professional world view in order to
incorporate civilian defined political realities,
it might gain access to the supreme levels of the
policy process; but it would no longer speak on
strategic matters from a military perspective. .
.
he believed that fusionism makes it inevitable that
military and political responsibilities will be
hopelessly intertwined in a confusing and
debilitating manner. "H^
The international and multidimensional aspect of the
Second World War introduced a complexity to military oper-
ations on a scale not previously reached. Now that the
present level of overlap and complication has been reached,
the growing interdependence the global actors demands that
the political, economic and physiological implications of
military action must be considered and compensated for.
TT7
Robert Lovett, Address delivered at West Point, May
1964.
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Having a member o£ each major command or staff
serving the role of fusionist on an otherwise purist staff
can be a measure of compromise. Each school of thought,
fusionist and purist, can be assured that its interest in
policy making is being addressed and negotiated in the
planning process. An experienced, well-informed naval
strategist could bridge the gap between the military planning
staffs that could operate more efficiently if concentrating
purely on military planning. Resident fusionist review and
advice applied to all plans before submittal would incre-
mentally improve the odds of approval when the plans are inter-
jected into the strata of arbitration through which military plans
must pass for approval.
2. Non-relational Strategies
Since the days of the Prussian staff journeys,
military strategists have focussed their planning efforts
toward relational strategies. The Prussian reformer
Scharnhorst demanded that all General Staff planners be
thoroughly familiar with the elements of a specific, antici-
pated battle. Terrain, enemy fortifications, weapons,
tactics, numbers, capabilities, intentions, estimates of
sustainability were all considered must items for campaign
planning. The foundation for Prussian strategies were based





Nothing more than a mention can be made here of
another perspective on planning to be used by strategic
planners, that of non-relational strategies. There are
unique characteristics of each military force that should be
taken into account whenever offensive or defensive strategies
are addressed. Nations possess certain assets, vulnerabilities
and inherent impediments to progress. Those national charac-
teristics must be regarded in all plans. A sought after
offensive capability cannot ignore resource, production or
technology limitations even if deemed necessary to counter
a confirmed or perceived enemy threat. Nations can do some
things better than other things. It should not build a
defense for which it is not suited just to counter an enemy's
offense. A national defense planner must insure that
adequate defenses are in being. With long lead times required
for the development and deployment of new weapons which
require larger shares of national resources, planners must
strive to provide national defense by matching assets to
needs. The nonrelational strategic perspective would support
America's forward deployed/power projection strategy, because
it is a relatively small, ocean dependent nation with secure
borders. The more easily formed relational strategy perspective
is probably why a small land-mass nation as the United States
would consider improved concentrated land-based nuclear
missiles as a primary military strength even after the Soviet
Union has demonstrated an ability to neutralize the land-based
123

nuclear option. A lower level application of nonrelational
strategies might establish policies in dealing with the rising
concerns with Third World nations by the far more powerful yet
in many respect impotent U.S. strength. Rather than supplying arms
to small nations to combat external-supported internal conflict,
the United States could adopt a bold stance of notifying the
world that it will cordon off the contested area from outside
interference until the original internal unrest is reduced.
Nonrelational strategies parallel the indirect approach
to military planning espoused by Andre Beaufre, Liddell Hart
119
and others. The major difference between the two approaches
is the focus of indirect strategies, including other than
purely military avenues such as economic, political and
unconventional means.
The above instruments can be used by the strategic
planner to add a new angle on difficult problems, perhaps
uncovering an undiscovered avenue for finding a solution.
Nothing will replace objective, detached and farsighted
approaches to strategic planning. The strategic planner
cannot rely only on mental abilities, but resourcefulness,
experience gained by longer duration assignments and his
ability to see problems clearly will provide a great service
to the Navy and its future.
lT5Beaufre views indirect strategy as including all elements
of warfare, psychological, military, economic, political,
diplomatic, etc. Hart focuses primarily on indirect approaches
to battlefield, military tactics and strategies.
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The two prime responsibilities of the naval strategist
are first to do what is required to improve the day to day-
effectiveness of the command to which he is assigned so that
more time is made available for increased lead time in all
command functions. Secondly, the strategist should force and
maintain his sights on the long term aspects and implications
of command and navy-wide objectives. With naval strategists
assigned to staffs or commands for five year minimum tours of
duty, the opportunities for enhanced efficiency and continuity
would be outstanding. Indoctrination of newly arrived command
personnel by a locally experienced naval strategist could
greatly reduce the time required for command members to begin
functioning in their new assignment.
Strategic planners will make a command or staff function
more efficient but it is paramount that effectiveness be





V. BENEFITS OF THE CORPS OF NAVAL STRATEGISTS
Where there is no vision, the people perish.
Proverbs 29:18
Many of the ills that befall attempts to improve the
effectiveness of Navy long-range planning cannot be overcome
without fundamental and sweeping changes to the American
structure. Elements in the nature of both the American socio-
political systems and within the Navy itself, preclude the
formulation and adherence to a long-range strategy without
continual revision. The pluralistic democracy is obliged to
accommodate a wide variety of views in almost all matters of
state including the size, composition and employment of
military forces. An historical review of U. S. Navy long-
range planning reveals a propensity to commission ad hoc study
groups to define and recommend courses of future actions for
Navy planning. To incorporate the suggestions of various study
panels, each Chief of Naval Operations creates a new division
responsible for long-range planning. When personally
administered and identified with a particular Navy leader its
fate is sealed with the changing of Navy command leadership.
In a system where millions of voters wield political power
of representation and Naval leadership changes course regularly,




"Most grand strategists also must contend with national
myths and tradition. In the United States, these are
intensely inhibitive, as the following samples suggest:
1. Never strike the first blow.
2. Fight "fairly in accord with 'the rules'".
3. Champion the underdog.
4. Avoid secret alliances and agreements.
5. Submit all major strategic decisions for
popular approval.
6. Support minimum forces in peacetime;
mobilize for war. 120
Optimality is not necessary as long as resources remain suf-
ficient. So far, U. S. actions have been adequate to meet
demands but without foresight and resolve, future adequacy
cannot be guaranteed. Unanimity among so disparate a people
is only achieved after evidence of urgency becomes overwhelming
Reinforcement of suspicions must far outweigh any possibility
of judgement error. Consensus is forged by fear and is quickly
dissipated after the lessening of tensions.
Analytical processes after confirmation of the need for
action will generally only support the alternative which will
most efficiently and expeditiously erradicate the present
danger or concern. The course of action is rarely aimed at
preventing a reoccurrence. Little thought is given to the
environment that will result from the chosen action; focus is
on solution of the problem short term. Public sentiment
120John M. Collins, Grand Strategy
,
(Annapolis: Naval
Institute Press, 1973), p. 20.
127

hobbles bold political or military adventurism while at the
same time preventing sudden or excessive swings of the state
pendulum. This balance is crucial to a society such as that
in America. The global milieu, evident in the early part o£
this century could easily accommodate the plodding, deliberate
response of American policy. Rapid communications which force
or give the impression of forcing rapid decisions has over-
taxed the decision making process in existence today. Short
term decision requirements, outpace and swamp the decision
process and leave no time or freedom for long-range thinking.
Only a totalitarian (dictator) state is capable of producing
and adhering to a long-range strategy, because of its centrality
of decision-making, single focus of ambition and command of
resources
.
The decision-making and policy formulation framework of
the United States has not kept pace with the changes of the
past few decades.
"In 1939 the United States had no military alliances and
no troops stationed in any foreign country. Except on
the high seas and within North America, the nation had
no offensive capability at all ...One generation later...
the United States had military alliances with 48 nations,
had 1,517,000 soldiers and sailors stationed in 119
countries, and had a military capacity sufficient to
destroy the world many times over. 121
Post World War II planners were forced to contend with an
international environment gravely more dangerous and
m Stephen E. Ambrose, "The Military and American Society
An Overview", The Military and America Society , Stephen E.
Ambrose and James A. Barber, Jr.
,




threatening than known in the pre-war times. Perhaps more
importantly for the post-war planners was the realization that
the new environment where the United States was thrust to the
position of Free World leader, no longer responded to the set of
rules to which planners had become accustomed.
"We confronted a world dominated by three factors foreign
to our experience."
1. The emergence of the United States into a position
of power
2. The emergence of the USSR with equal power
3. New warfare reduced all conventional military and
diplomatic solutions to uncertainties, air ,2?
delivered atomic weapons were the most salient.
Elsewhere the author amplifies the impact of atomic weapons
on future planners by stating:
"in the very last days of the great conflict the power
of airborne demolition bombardment had been suddenly
stepped up by a factor of 20,000. Nothing like this
had ever happened before. The weapons and techniques
developed in the course of earlier wars had usually
carried important hints of coming change, but no one
such revolutionary change as this had actually been
demonstrated. This eleventh-hour triumph of the
embattled scientists altered at a stroke almost every
calculation and every formula on which statesmen,
strategists and military technicians had been accustomed
to rely. The general staffs of 1914 - highly trained,
thoroughly expert and devoted men of war - had com-
pounded a disaster for which there seemed no answer.
So the mobilized scientists of 1945 - also highly
trained, expert and devoted to the furtherance of the
country's interest - had compounded a terrible problem
Tn
Walter, Arms and Men
,
(New York: The New American
Library of World Literature, Inc. 1958) p. 273.
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for which no rational solution was apparent to
themselves or to anyone else. "123
The threatening environment continues to compound th-e
problem for strategists. The Navy has produced many viable
long-range plans but their acceptability has most often been
short-lived. Plans to meet long-range shipbuilding needs are
complicated by long lead times for design, production and
deployment and the rapid pace of technological advances
rendering some equipment obsolete before introduction to the
fleet. This longer lead time for Navy equipment added the
array of planning obstacles present in the other services,
suggests that the Navy create a planning system that adapts
readily to change yet is effective over the long term.
One step toward devising an effective planning system
could be to compile the advantages of past attempts, delineate
safeguards against past disadvantages then weave that data
into the framework of recommendations offered by Navy com-
missioned study panels. From the German General Staff concept
it was revealed that the education of planners is essential to
military planning. Military organizational expertise must be
promoted by specialization of duty, thorough knowledge of
operational, material, geographical and personnel capability
constraints. This specialized training should be gained and
updated by near permanent staff assignments augmented by close






to planning functions which require longevity for attainment
and full time attention for maintenance.
Disadvantages inherent in the general staff concept stemmed
from rigidity and the lack of checks on ambition. The inflexi-
bility of the staff system was born out of elitism in a single
dominant service, the army. Complications resulted when a
system which had been functioning, successful and supreme, for
several decades was forced to accommodate and acquiesce to the
use of naval and air forces. Operating under the control of
a single ruler meant that the influence exerted by military
commanders was inversely proportional to the strength of the
monarch. The fatal rise to militarism came as a result of
natural organizational predation, the military expanded to the
limits of its confines. With a weak but ambitious ruler
giving way to military adventurism, all obstacles to military
dominance are erased. Reviewing modern democratic states
projects a considerable degree of assurance that control by a
single individual or rampant militarism is hardly conceivable
today.
A prime objective of the General Staff concept was to
closely link planning with operations. Efficiency of trans-
lation from plan to execution resulted because of the
offensive ambitions and presumed eventual execution of
Prussian war aims. It is an assumption of this proposal that
at least in modern times, planning stops when execution of the
plan is begun unless a degree of isolation is maintained
between the crisis managers and the long-range strategists.
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Two important hard-earned lessons from corporate strategic
planning are directly applicable to military planning.
1. Whichever system is devised to serve the planning
function must be adapted to the organization.-'-'^^
2. Long-range planning is the responsibility of top
management, but the line must have a voice. 1-^
Having those responsible for long-range planning dispersed
throughout the various command levels within the Navy functions
as an adaptation of long-range planning to each level of
command and offers a voice for those who must plan operations
and those who must execute the plans to the immediate
dec is ion -maker.
Past studies commissioned by the Navy to help determine
its long-range planning heeds have espoused broad,
generalized remedies for Navy planning but few feasible
suggestions for implementation. The need for long-range
planning is a commonly expressed recommendation; even if the
plan is not accepted totally it still provides a focus for
the Navy's future. Planning must be an ongoing process not
controlled or identified with any one policy-maker. Planners
James B. Whittaker, Strategic Planning in a Rapidly
Changing Environment
,
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,
D.C. Heath and Company, 1978) p. 12-13.
George A. Steiner, Strategic Planning
,
(New York: The
Free Press, 1979) p. 10-11.
The three studies were mentioned above, "Major
Organizational Considerations for the Chief of Naval Operations,"
"The Maritime Balance Study," and the "Historical Perspectives
in Long- Range Planning in the Navy."
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should have direct access to policy makers but a planning
system with a consolidated group near the CNO loses touch
with the widely dispersed operating forces. Direct access to
policymakers can be achieved by assignment of strategic
planners to decision makers at several echelons of command.
Strategic planners cannot be isolated from current problems,
but their involvement should be strictly limited to long-range
implications of an existing crisis. To paraphrase a state-
ment in a speech given at the Naval Postgraduate School in
November 1982, Admiral Thomas Hayward suggested that there
is a very real need for systems analysis, quantification,
budgeteering and programming but that their proponents should
be the last inputs at the decision-maker's door. It would
follow this proposal perfectly for the strategic planner to be
the last into the office of the decision-maker.
As stated earlier, the specific duties of the strategic
planner will vary considerably between the various commands
where assigned because of the variety of command requirements.
There are two primary modes of operations for the function
of strategic planners at any given command staff level. The
first role for the planner relates to directly supporting the
command level decision-maker while the second role connects
the long-range planner with the command staff responsible for
the generation of command plans.
Direct support to the commander can be imagined in a
front door or back door approach. At the front door to the
133

decision-maker, the strategic planner would be responsible
for helping to structure the problems to be solved. The
clarification of objectives, assessment of needs and resources,
determination of alternatives, and very importantly the
verification of all data would be prime assistance functions
to command level decision-makers of strategic planners. The
verification and translation of data would be particularly
useful in joint U. S. or allied planning staffs. Army
operations are not necessarily understandable in Navy terms
and it is not important for Navy leaders to attempt to gain
a working knowledge of other service functions when the need
for such would perhaps be shortlived. The staff planner could
research and present what information is necessary about other
units. With the assignment longevity of strategic planners
it is likely that the information would be used again and
again but not have to be relearned because the same planner
is available over a longer tour. Update of the desired know-
ledge is all that would be required. If performed properly
and adequately the front door role of the strategic planner
could minimize the problem definition and debate time thereby
freeing up some time for the decision-maker. Small,
incremental improvements in effectiveness and efficiency of
the planning effort could over time, allow expansion of the
staff's time horizon for plans.
The back door role for the strategic planner would be a
modified role of the front door approach. A planner would
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follow the same steps as above but would concentrate on
verification of data, the veracity of contending proponents
and the weighing of options. The planner would serve as an
independent well-informed sounding board for the decision-
maker during the deliberation process. A strategic planner
would not overlap the duties of a chief of staff, but would
support his position by the planners' staff -specif ic corporate
memory and broad experience. Present career paths that lead
to chief of staff positions tend to restrict officers to a
single warfare specialty even if exposure to other specialties
is gained.
The second primary role for strategic planners would
center around the review process of staff plans and policy
inputs. Operational staff members would continue to
formulate plans just as is done presently. The strategic
planner would be available to assist in any way requested
but the planner's function would be to add a comment to each
outgoing or approved plan. No judgment concerning the plan
or policy's validity, feasibility or relevance would be made,
but simply an estimate or forecast of the long-term ramifi-
cations of the proposed course of actions would be attached.
Two views of this function may serve to elucidate the role.
At the beginning, long-range assessments may be viewed with
some skepticism, but as forecasts improve they may serve as
valuable source for staff introspection and as a reminder of
future consequences. Most decisions of any importance have
135

short-term expediences but long-term ramifications. Decisions
that would better serve the distant future - solve rather
than postpone a problem - but that are not politically or
fiscally acceptable in the near term must still be overridden
or delayed just as before. But, with a ready glimpse of
proximate results of the proposed action made available to
all levels of arbitration, it is hoped that an evolutionary
trend of striving for the longer term solution to problems
will result.
In a review phase of the planning process the strategic
planner offers a new perspective on planning. If an illus-
tration from chess is used the operational staff should plan
on a basis of one to two moves ahead of the present. The
staff rarely has the luxury of time to assess the strategic
implications of every command action. The resident strategic
planner should maintain his focus on four to five moves ahead
of the present. A long-range strategic plan cannot be
written for a given region or objective without taking into
account all likely outcomes of any present day crisis. Current
plans are drawn up to diffuse or stabilize a situation for a
zero to three-year time period. The planner should view the
same situational facts but map a strategy acceptable for ten
to twenty years. Failure for a strategic planner at four or
five moves ahead would come from an unforeseen, unanticipated




The United States Navy has not maintained a consistent
and continuous long-range strategic planning system. It is
doubtful that the American societal and political realties
would allow such a system to function without disruption or
with independent authority. The Navy has more than met its
responsibilities levied by the United States and it has planned
adequately for its future needs as evidenced by its status
in the world today. However, improvements can be made to the
present system and, indeed, are demanded by the rapid pace of
change and awesome complexity of the future environment.
After reviewing past experiences with strategic planning
systems from-other than U. S. national military establishments,
the corporate business world and the Navy itself, it appears
reasonable that a process compiled from advantages of other
systems which match the recommendations of Navy study panels
can evolutionally improve the effectiveness of Navy long-range
planning. A network of highly educated and specifically
trained officers dispersed throughout the Navy command
structure could form the foundation for future improvements.
The planners would augment each staff rather than compete for
any staff position with other officers. They would function
without authority but be an invaluable source of corporate
knowledge for the decision-maker and staff. With lengthened
tours of assignment and support from the strategic planner
network, the addition of planners to various command staffs
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should measurably improve consistency and continuity to
policy formulation, avoid the hobbling effects of the career-
driven rotation cycle on expertise and the staff should
function as smoothly in wartime as in peacetime.
The strategic planning network could be easily introduced
to the present Navy system without upheaval. An ongoing
planning process such as proposed would avoid the enervating
consequence of creating and disbanding a long-range planning
group at intervals determined by changes in the Chief of
Naval Operations. Having a core of officers experienced in
all three major warfare specialties could enhance the
capability of Naval forces in the application of combined
arms
.
It is assumed that command and promotion opportunities
for strategic planners will be limited in the early stages
of implementation. But when the corps of strategists is
viewed as an initial step toward an eventual, much more
effective system coupled with the commitment of dedicated
officers, the sacrifice is acceptable. The Navy's long-range
planning effectiveness could be improved manyfold by
incorporating a network of skilled strategists throughout
its ranks and capped by a long-serving, unparalleled
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